Should The World Fear China- Zhou Bo

Zhou Bo is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

In his prior life, he was a Senior Colonel in the People's Liberation Army of China.

In this episode, we discuss the role China seeks to play on the international stage amidst its intensifying rivalry with the USA.

CHAPTERS
00:00 Intro & Trailer
01:20 China's Multifaceted Identity
04:47 Perceptions of China: Fear and Uncertainty
07:41 China's Historical Context and Future Aspirations
10:40 China's Core Interests and Global Role
12:06 China's Economic Development Initiatives
17:12 China's Security Role in the Global Order
20:07 China's Position on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
29:06 China's Role as a Broker in Global Conflicts
33:07 US-China Relations: A Complex Rivalry
38:58 Navigating the South China Sea Disputes
41:13 Lessons from Trump's First Term
48:28 Building Trust Between China and the US
53:10 China's Image in the Global Arena
53:58 Advice For The Young

Keith 00:01:32

China wears many hats. It is the largest industrial economy, the world's largest manufacturer, and in the past five years it has emerged as one of the world's most advanced technological powers as well. My question to you would then be, given the multiple hats that China is wearing, how does this affect the kind of identity China holds today?

Zhou Bo 00:01:50

That indeed is a bigger challenge because China is still wearing so many hats. When people talk about China, it's very much the China in their eyes. If you are standing in different places and looking at China in different light, then you have a different China. The problem is everything is true.

For example, China is an industrial nation as you mentioned - the largest exporter, second largest importer, the largest trade nation. But at the same time, the largest developing country. This becomes very confusing because China by GDP is already the second largest economy in the world, and by purchasing power parity already the largest economy in the world. But China, of course, is still a developing country if its wealth is divided by its heavy population.

Then we come to this most confusing question: how can a developing country be the largest economy or the second largest economy in the world? This is really confusing because you do not have quite a specific standard as to what is a developed country or what is a developing country according to the World Bank or UN. You just don't have the answer.

Keith 00:03:16

So what does this paradox mean for the Chinese people or the Chinese government in the way it sees itself? Does it see itself as a superpower primarily, or does it see itself as a developing country?

Zhou Bo 00:03:31

China certainly would not describe itself as a superpower. China says it is still a developing country, and I have even heard the Chinese government describing China saying that China will always remain a developing country. So as I said, if China's wealth is divided by its population, this is all right.

But now even in the West, for example at a Munich Security Conference this year, in my interview with a journalist from Deutsche Welle, he actually described me as a Chinese colonel coming from another superpower. So this kind of description of China as a superpower is not only heard in Africa, it's also now more and more heard in the West. This kind of identity really confuses people.

That is why I just gave the title of my book as "Should the World Fear China?" But this actually is not the title I tried to give to my book. It's actually the first question raised to me by the German journalist from Deutsche Welle. So I didn't expect that he just asked me so straightforward: "Colonel, tell me, should the world fear China?" This is the first question. I forgot what I said, but I have remembered this question.

For me, this question best epitomises the world's attitude, especially the attitude of the West towards China. So China's rise is a given, but what does it mean for the world? Is it a fortune or misfortune?

Keith 00:05:15

If you look at different regions - Southeast Asia, Africa like what you've pointed out, even in Europe and the West - it seems that in the West they are more afraid or they have this fear. Why do you think that's the case?

Zhou Bo 00:05:34

You're absolutely correct because the West's attitude and Western countries' attitude, and the attitude of African countries and even countries in the Indo-Pacific, are certainly different. The West's attitude toward China is a kind of uncertainty blended with fear.

That is because they traditionally thought that the world is actually a kind of liberal international order, which I disagree totally. Why is that? Because they would argue that the world order after the Second World War is a kind of liberal international order. This is totally wrong.

But why is that wrong? Because they just believe the rules and regimes made by the West, primarily in the economic field, constitute the world order. But I would believe that the world order is much more complicated, much bigger. The rules and regimes are part of the order, but at the same time, if you look at the world, you would have to consider there are different cultures, different social systems, different religions, and above all, different civilizations. The world order would of course include all these together.

So if you just believe the international order is liberal international order, you become narcissistic. You would believe that you are indispensable or you are the city upon the hill. But if you then find the Western liberal democracy is in constant recession and will continue to decline, then you wonder why you start to panic, then you start to look for enemies. So that is exactly how the United States is thinking about China.

But if you think like me that the world is an order that comprises all kinds of civilizations, then you would ask yourself this question: how can my civilization coexist with his civilization?

Keith 00:07:55

I recently spoke with former diplomat in Singapore Bilahari Kausikan, and he did share that apprehension, which is that in China people always reference the century of humiliation. It figures deeply into the Chinese mind or the Chinese psyche. So you think about the Opium War, the Rape of Nanking, and even the invasion into Manchuria. There is a worry that as China references itself as a past victim, as it becomes a great power it will be overly aggressive or assertive, that it might make neighbouring countries worried. Do you think there is some truth to that, or do you think there are some things that China can take reference to and perhaps improve on this perception gap?

Zhou Bo 00:08:44

Well, I think you're absolutely correct. Bilahari is my friend. As I have written in my own article, I think the Chinese should get out of this kind of victimhood. Because all what you have cited are correct, but even mathematically speaking, if this kind of century of humiliation started with Opium War in 1840, then by 1940 it should be over, right? And nine years later, Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people have stood up when he announced the establishment of People's Republic of China.

So if Chinese people have already stood up, you should remember the past but embrace the future. Again, we come to the same basis: if China is already the second largest economy in the world, are you still a victim? And one day you could become the largest economy by GDP. So how can the largest economy in the world be a victim at the same time? I think you are the envy of the world, the example for so many developing countries. That is China.

Keith 00:10:05

In your work, you point out that China should see itself as an example or as a trailblazer in how you can advance development. Are there any other narratives that China should embrace in its new conception of its political identity on the international stage?

Zhou Bo 00:10:22

I think China will remain a socialist country, which makes China different from most countries on earth. But it also shows that different kinds of social systems could coexist, and even a socialist country can become very much developed. So I think this is about the Chinese way of thinking and China's social system.

But China is not exporting this. I don't believe that many countries in the world would wish to become socialist countries. They have their own choices. So what China is now promoting overseas actually is a kind of civilisation of grand ideas that can become accepted, and most of them could be found in the principles of the United Nations.

For example, I think what China can really provide to the world is its lesson in how it could alleviate poverty of 800 million people within a short span of 40 years. And this is what is badly needed for the rest of the world.

Keith 00:11:34

What do you think China's core interests are, and what are these core interests that drive behaviours before we even look at their behaviours on the international stage?

Zhou Bo 00:11:46

Well, I think that is a complicated question, but I think I have heard Chinese leaders describing this: just to let Chinese people live a better life. I think that is the goal of the Chinese leaders and also the goal of the Chinese people. Of course, at the same time, we would also have some other issues like reunification with Taiwan and so on and so forth. But simply put, let people live a better life. That is the goal.

Keith 00:12:14

Now people are looking at China to not only preserve the international order but also be a champion of it. In what ways do you see China, outside of the economic angle, contributing to perhaps a reshaping of an international order?

Zhou Bo 00:12:35

That's a good point because it's difficult to describe the international order - what exactly is international order? But it is fair for me to say that since reform and opening up, China has indeed benefited a lot from globalisation, from learning from the West, from sending hundreds of thousands of students to go to the West to study, and also China has benefited from learning the market economy, Western technology, and so on and so forth.

So China is a beneficiary of the existing international order, whatever it is described. Therefore, there's no reason for China to overthrow this order. So you would hear Chinese leaders talking about how China could become a guardian of the international order - this existing international order. And sometimes they talk about improvement of this order. That is also allowable because anything can be improved.

So fundamentally speaking, China is not trying to challenge this system or even to overthrow this system. It's interesting, for example, when China, India, and Russia are talking about multipolarity, sometimes I wonder whether they're talking about the same thing. They all talk about multipolarity. I think this kind of multipolarity for China and India probably is similar because India also has benefited from the international system. But Russia's attitude probably is different. Russia doesn't like the existing international order.

So I think even if we're talking about the same thing, there is nuance, there is subtlety.

Keith 00:14:25

If China seeks to preserve but at the same time reform, where would it start?

Zhou Bo 00:14:32

I think China is already doing that. For example, China is championing some grand ideas like Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative. But it's also doing something very practical like Belt and Road Initiative, which is basically an economic project but also has strategic and political significance and ramifications. But that comes later because first of all it is just a kind of economic project.

And then you are seeing Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, you are seeing BRICS, which is already larger in terms of economy than the G7. So what is the importance of BRICS? I believe the driver is a kind of common resentment toward the dominance of American dollar. But we're not so sure until this stage where the end game would look like. I think it is just like a train that is already moving, so everybody wants to get onto the train. Everybody is afraid of being left behind. So that is why you are seeing so many countries want to join BRICS, but the end game is still not that clear because if we talk about a BRICS currency, certainly it is premature.

Keith 00:16:08

If China is to look at the economic development angle in terms of trying to push the global economic development agenda, it is in a sense maybe best served when it is maybe a China-driven project like BRI as opposed to something more multilateral. Is that a preference?

Zhou Bo 00:16:25

Just imagine: China by per capita income is still a developing country, but this kind of project of Belt and Road is unprecedented in human history. And it is so audacious. And it will take a long time. But I think China has come to the very point that is to improve the infrastructure of developing countries.

And how come China could have this kind of idea? Because China has learned from its own past - that better roads lead to better life. So that is why China is so good at infrastructure building. And I believe poor countries definitely need good infrastructure, and that is precisely what China is good at. So by building better infrastructure, I think that would lay a sound basis for the development of these countries.

Keith 00:17:32

On the flip side of economics is security. So how does China conceptualise its role in the global world order in regards to security? I know you talked briefly about China being a peacekeeper as opposed to being a global policeman of sorts, but how does it see itself with regards to being a responsible stakeholder in security globally?

Zhou Bo 00:17:58

Ever since China reformed and opened up in 1979, I think China has already proved one thing - that China's rise is peaceful. Now there is another challenge that lies ahead: that is to prove that China, in spite of development, in spite of growing strength, would not become a hegemon. So China can be strong, but China would not be a hegemon. This is something that China needs to prove.

So is this such a possibility? I think I'm optimistic. Why is that? Because so far, if you look at the PLA's military operations overseas, you would find that they are all humanitarian in nature. And this is not accidental - it's a choice. So far, PLA is only involved in peacekeeping, counter-piracy, disaster relief - all these kind of things. And all these kind of things, militarily speaking, are called military operations other than war. They're humanitarian in nature.

So if you just do humanitarian work, then people would be grateful to you because nobody disagrees about the nature of these activities. And besides, China has been sending its naval hospital ship called Peace Ark around the world to provide free medical treatment and free medicine. This is now a Euro naval ship.

What is PLA Navy trying to do? I think PLA Navy is emulating Admiral Zheng He of Ming Dynasty. Admiral Zheng He made seven voyages in Indian Ocean. He also used force when necessary, but people's impression of Admiral Zheng He is not that this is a general who would use force from time to time. He's a general that has demonstrated the generosity of the Middle Kingdom. He would give away silk, porcelain, and so on.

So I think that is why Peace Ark is doing the same thing. China wants to be loved. China doesn't want to be feared.

Keith 00:20:14

But at the same time, if we were to maybe look at some of the conflicts that China is tangentially or marginally involved in, one example that people would point out is for example the Russia and Ukraine war, which is that some of the critics might say that because Russia and China has an unlimited friendship, and at the same time China seeks to play a balanced role in this - they see from what I've read from your work is that you see yourself as a mediator between two friends. Ukraine is a trading partner and Russia is a friend. And in that case, is China's unwillingness to condemn Russia something that is harming its reputation as a peacemaker? What do you think about that critique?

Zhou Bo 00:20:58

I think China has condemned Russia in its own way because soon after the invasion, China has talked about respect of sovereignty. So that is Chinese way of saying you are not respecting sovereignty of another nation. So China did not say you are invading another country - this is a violation of sovereignty. But China called for respect of sovereignty. That is the Chinese way of criticising Russia because, as you have pointed out, China and Russia's relationship is good.

Although people would sometimes talk about how this partnership is unlimited, I believe that China also has some bottom lines which are truly tested in this war. For example, this is not one of our lives. Iran gave drones, North Korea gave ammunition and missiles, but China did not give any military aid to Russia. Some people talked about it, some people speculated on it, but it turned out to be not true. If China did that, it will not go uncovered.

And China won't back any possible use of nuclear weapons. So I think people forgot this because this kind of inaction from Chinese side is very much like oxygen in the air - you would only realise it until you don't have it. China's contribution in this war is that it's not throwing wood into the fire. Just imagine if China really stood on Russian side - this is the dawn of the Third World War.

Keith 00:22:56

Why do you think China does not take a more assertive stance in that case? For example, in Singapore, our government here, they take the view that this should be condemned and it's something that we even put sanctions on the Russians for, whereas China, it's much more subtle in the way you communicate your disagreement. What do you think explains this difference?

Zhou Bo 00:23:22

Because China is, first of all, a much bigger country than Singapore. And besides, China and Russia are largest neighbours toward each other, and there were actually some unpleasant times in our history. So now that period was gone, therefore we have to take very good care of this relationship because it matters tremendously to us.

Besides, of course, there are also tactical considerations. For example, if you just condemn Russia like the West has hoped for, the whole West would probably give you a standing ovation. But then the question is, would your relationship with the United States really improve? I don't think so. They will just come back to you as a competitor the next day. You won't change this kind of China-US relationship.

Keith 00:24:25

Do you see China being a possible peacemaker in this conflict, other than the fact that it doesn't throw wood into the fire, or do you think that this is actually probably the maximal limit that they can operate within this conflict?

Zhou Bo 00:24:39

I think China can make some further contributions depending on how the situation changes. For example, we don't know how long this war will last, but no war will last forever. So definitely there would be a time when a ceasefire would become possible. And then if this ceasefire becomes formalised, it might be what people call armistice.

So I believe China's role - in spite of its proposals already made, quite a few proposals actually - China's role would just come at a second stage or third stage. That is, at the first stage, the most useful conversation is between Moscow and Washington. I don't believe that it's really a conversation between Moscow and Kyiv. So it is the United States that is holding the key and President Putin that is holding the key. So let them talk.

But then after this kind of talk, I think President Putin has one bottom line: that is, he wants full control of the four oblasts that are already written into Russian constitution as Russian territory. So right now you would see news flying around every day, but I believe this is his bottom line. There would not be really serious negotiations until he has full control of the four regions.

But let's assume even if he has full control of the four regions, it's not a kind of peace forever because if Ukrainians are not happy, they could turn the disputed Ukrainian territory into battlefields like those we have seen in Afghanistan. They would have guerrilla warfare. So there's no guarantee that Russians can lay back and sleep. And besides, Ukraine is supported by the whole West.

So then why do I say that China's role could come later? For example, if there is a ceasefire, then the question is who is going to guarantee this ceasefire? Ukraine is afraid of Russia, and Russia is also afraid of Ukraine that is backed by the West. So they need external actors, players who can say, "Okay, this is the deal. We are the guarantors." So then China could be one of them.

And this is exactly what happened in 1990 when Ukraine decided to give up nuclear weapons. But unfortunately, this kind of guarantee actually failed. But there is still possibility that this may come back again in this form.

The second thing is if peacekeepers are needed, certainly China is most suitable to send the troops along with other countries. China may not be the only country because there's no need for China to be the only country. But China is one of the P5 countries, the largest troop-contributing country of the P5, and the second largest donor of peacekeeping fund. So China can take the lead.

You remember Ukraine's president, Polish prime minister, British prime minister, French president all talked about peacekeeping, but none of the proposals would actually work because Russia would not accept NATO's role in Ukraine. So the best formula in my mind is China takes the lead, followed by other major contributing countries like India. India is also a large contributor of peacekeeping, plus some other countries from Global South and a few countries of non-NATO European countries.

Why is that? Because this is a war in the heartland of Europe, so Europe should also have its representative, but not NATO countries. So in that sense, you are the honest broker.

Keith 00:29:10

When they are coming to the table, I think China could be one of the honest brokers. I doubt China would be the only broker. So first of all, it's still a talk between Russia and the United States.

I've noticed a lot of commentators point at this war as an analogue for China's attempt at reunification with Taiwan. That seems to be something that continues to swell in the mainstream media.

Zhou Bo 00:29:42

Well, when I understand how people become afraid because all of a sudden we have a war in Europe, and then they would look around and see other potential hot spots, and the Taiwan Strait seems to be one of them. So they're worried. I do not blame them for that.

But the reality is that the Chinese government is still talking about peaceful reunification. And the former American Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin said twice at the two Shangri-La Dialogues that a conflict is not imminent or inevitable. So I think what he said really matters to me. I was there when he made these remarks because there are so many other American generals, admirals who said China would attack Taiwan in 2025, 2027, and even the Air Force general who has nothing to do with operation, who is in charge of logistics, would say according to his gut feelings China will attack Taiwan in 2025 or something.

But you may have your gut feeling. You may share it with your friends, but if you just mention this to thousands of your subordinates and make it international headlines, that is irresponsible because that is even refuted by Pentagon.

Keith 00:31:02

So do you see the conditions for reunification to be something that will change in the near term, or do you think that it will just be status quo for as long as both sides continue to, for example, trade with each other, travel to each other, and then hopefully conditions improve down the line?

Zhou Bo 00:31:28

I would say that the so-called status quo is never static. Every day the situation is changing, is fluid. So we just cannot assume that it will remain like this forever. And then as to when we might use force, actually it's not a secret because it is clearly written in Anti-Secession Law, in which three conditions are identified.

I would not recite the exact words, but basically the first one is Taiwan declares independence, which I believe is impossible. They won't be so stupid to do that. The second thing is, of course, foreign forces making efforts to lead Taiwan's separation from mainland. In this case, I think it is more or less sounds like Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, which has triggered a four-day exercise around the island. But even Nancy Pelosi would not be so powerful to be able to take away Taiwan from mainland China. So I believe this situation is also difficult to be found really.

But the last condition really matters: that is, if the Chinese government believes that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted forever, then we may have to adopt non-peaceful means. So what is the conclusion? The conclusion is the whole world, including United States and its allies, have to let Beijing believe that peaceful reunification is still possible, and the Taiwanese authorities themselves have to behave.

Keith 00:33:18

So to conclude, if we were to zoom out because I think a lot of our conversation so far has not yet touched on this bigger theme, which is US-China relations, and I think a lot of them define how China operates or interacts with other states, be it in Russia and Ukraine or within Southeast Asia or even with the Taiwan question. The US-China relations right now, to people even in Singapore, is that there might be some days where there is good weather, but the climate is bad, meaning that we might see some changes occasionally, but they don't reflect a pattern of improvement over time. Sometimes people describe it as a kind of new Cold War.

Zhou Bo 00:33:58

I don't really buy that. Why don't I buy that? Because people only know a Cold War is a Cold War when people look back into the past, because at that time every day people were preparing for hot war. But then there's relief - okay, we didn't have a hot war. So what we had was a Cold War.

Now we are looking into the future. We don't know how the future will become. Nobody would know that. But I think this kind of major power relationship is always competitive. That is for sure, in spite of the social system whatsoever, your ideology. But people often forget that the major power relationship is also resilient because the consequence would be too big. So that is why you see even in this tariff war, no matter how alarming it looks like, China and United States have still come to an agreement of talking through this, and it's faster than most people have expected.

Keith 00:35:12

In terms of security, one of the areas that China is quite concerned about, I think, would be for example the South China Sea. And I referenced one of our defence ministers who recently just retired - he talks about the fact that in the South China Sea issue, there is a greater game being played. And in China, one of its interests is to seek its own variant of a Monroe Doctrine that the US has. Do you think that is a fair assessment?

Zhou Bo 00:35:41

No, no, no. I totally disagree. Well, if China has a Monroe Doctrine, that means China wants to keep a kind of sphere of its own influence. But I would argue that it is impossible for China to have any spheres anywhere because in South China Sea, there are countries who are American allies. There are also a few claimants. So how can this be your sphere of influence? You just cannot wish these countries away.

Because the Chinese claim, I know, is not agreed by many other countries, but China has been consistent in its own claim, which has its own records, its own history. So it's not because China wants to control this region therefore we have to have this Monroe Doctrine. Because China is an ancient civilisation, and in that regard, China has more historical records than anyone about these claims in the South China Sea. So I don't believe China will have a kind of Monroe Doctrine. It's not because of that.

Keith 00:36:54

But maybe if you're a Southeast Asian country, your challenge might be that when you have these claims, we weren't even born yet. So wouldn't that leave us with some form of uncertainty of sorts where it just can't be because of the fact that maybe you've been here around longer and therefore some of these territories are yours? What's your response to that or what's your thinking around that?

Zhou Bo 00:37:16

Well, I understand these countries are small countries in front of such a juggernaut or elephant like China. So I understand how they feel. But I would say that China probably is the most benign elephant in the world. So you see, China has never even talked about using force against any of these claimants, and China is negotiating Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. This has yet to become fruitful, but at least China is talking to them. And they even disagree among these claimants themselves. So I think China has been quite tolerant of the situation.

Well, people always mention China-Philippine tension, but what is the root cause? The root cause is because the ship - the rusted ship deliberately stranded at Second Thomas Shoal - has become more and more rusted. It probably cannot sustain itself. Therefore, the Filipino government tried to fortify it by carrying some cement to maintain this ship. That is not allowed by China. We have been quite tolerant with these people. Otherwise, how can they stay there for 26 years? One or two dozen people - how could they stay there for 26 years if we want to drive them away or use force against them? It's totally impossible. So in that regard, China actually has been quite patient with them. This is my conclusion.

Keith 00:39:08

So what's your view on the Code of Conduct? Do you think it's actually possible that the different claimants, including Southeast Asian countries that have all different views on it, could there be a possible Code of Conduct? If not, what do you think are the conditions that's needed for a successful or more peaceful way in approaching some of the disagreements we have over the South China Sea?

Zhou Bo 00:39:29

I think there is a kind of political decision to speed up this kind of process of negotiation, but eventually how it might look like, I have also heard a lot of different opinions. One is whether this COC would have teeth or not - that is, whether it would become legally binding or not. Remember, this negotiation is not only between China and other countries who have claimants - they have disagreements about this COC themselves.

For example, we have already finished the so-called three readings, but according to some experts, it's very easy. If you want to read them through, maybe in ten to fifteen minutes. But the outstanding issues are still there. If you do not handle them, you can easily finish reading, but these issues would be difficult. So I don't know how to resolve this issue. Well, let's leave it to the experts to find out.

Keith 00:40:30

Now that Trump has returned to the office, you noted that China is much more psychologically prepared for his return. So then I have to ask a question: what lessons did the Chinese government draw from his first term and how they have prepared for it? So I think one example that comes to mind was with a conversation with Professor Susan Shirk, where she talks about ever since the first trade war, China has been intentionally diversifying its export economy away from the US, I suppose trying to reduce its dependency or its exposure to the US in terms of global trade from 20% I think in 2016 to about 16% around this year. Are there any lessons that they've drawn in terms of managing Trump's return to the office?

Zhou Bo 00:41:20

I think what you have mentioned is certainly right. China's dependency on the United States has certainly decreased. And I believe he's not so unpredictable as he claimed himself. You see, playing with this kind of unpredictability normally would work on a small country which has strength much smaller compared to yours. But if you are playing this kind of strategy with a peer competitor, this would not really work because his strength is almost as strong as yours. So even if you look unpredictable, so what? Eventually what matters is the real strength.

I think at this time, all the people around the world can see that China actually has won the first round of this tariff war by sticking to its principles, by vowing to fight to the end. So who winked first?

Keith 00:42:27

Do you think there will be a return to this kind of tactics again by the Trump administration, or do you think that hopefully this will be the end and after this pause, they can work towards more productive things or productive relationship?

Zhou Bo 00:42:49

Well, I don't know what's down the road, but I think it is good for me to hear that they're going to establish working groups to talk about all these - I don't know how many working groups, but it reminds me of something in the past, like during Obama's period, the so-called Strategic and Economic Dialogues where we will have so many baskets, there are so many outcomes. So I think that looks like a kind of healthy yet competitive relationship.

I think Trump will realise that this time he's really facing a peer competitor, but this peer competitor has expressed that it would always open the door for talks. So Chinese people are reasonable people. It is Donald Trump who actually is launching a crusade not only against China but against the whole world. What makes China different is that China is the only country in the world who has the stamina and guts to push back, not only in the economic field but also in the military field.

For example, the US military would always do a lot of sailing and flying in the name of freedom of navigation, but China is the only country that would warn them and follow the US ships and aircraft to give them warnings against America's provocation. And no other country would do that.

Keith 00:44:31

That's ironic as well that in America they don't ratify UNCLOS even though they champion freedom of navigation.

Zhou Bo 00:44:36

That's right, that's right. This shows kind of double standard.

Keith 00:44:44

Is the core of the US-China rivalry something that's purely going to worsen over time? Do you think there are conditions in which this rivalry, this competition, could actually be productive and actually have more net positive dynamics for both US and China, just given the fact of how intertwined your economies are?

Zhou Bo 00:45:03

I would say I hope so because China certainly is not trying to export its own ideologies overseas, and China is a beneficiary of the existing system. And the US, I think, I kind of understand why the US is using this kind of strategy because the US probably just believes in the world there are two kinds of people: American people and those people who want to become Americans. So they have a real kind of narcissism about themselves.

In modern elite words, the United States is indispensable, and they have described themselves as a city upon the hill. I always tell people there is indeed a city upon the hill, which is in Jerusalem - empty, windy, personal - where we have a lot of tourists. That is the only city upon the hill. Is the United States really a kind of city like that? Why just can't you come down the hill and we live together? That is the real world.

So from Chinese side, I don't believe China really has intention to provoke or challenge the United States. I think the United States has to change its own mentality. It will take some time because China's rise is so fast, and the United States would find China so strong yet so different. So it becomes panicking and it became nervous, and it wants to fight back.

So there is a kind of long road. Even from Obama, starting from Obama, you can see how they have become more confrontational. And during Trump's first term, you won't believe that there are many areas of cooperation - nothing much more than climate change or nuclear non-proliferation were mentioned. But during the Biden administration, something more were mentioned because how can you just manage the world without cooperation from China?

So I think eventually, with declining American strength, they would become more realistic. They would know that they're just another member of the international community. This is always my argument: America would not necessarily be more proud than the Maldives. The Maldives is a small nation in the ocean. It doesn't have NBA, it doesn't have McDonald's, it doesn't have Hollywood. But so what? Every day tourists from around the world would come to Maldives to let them know how beautiful the country is, and that is good enough for the Maldivians.

So that is why this kind of diversity makes this world beautiful. So we should talk about how people could coexist on this planet.

Keith 00:48:34

If you were to look at China and the US now, what you're arguing for is essentially much more ideological diversity within the US - that they accept China for what it is. My follow-up question for you would then be: do you think there are areas in which China can proactively deepen trust with the US, or both sides can come together and deepen trust with each other? Is there a way to accomplish that?

Zhou Bo 00:49:01

That is a very interesting question because I think I'm one of the few Chinese who actually don't think that this issue of trust is very important. Why is that? Because from the Cold War, you can tell the two enemies do not trust each other, but they have almost the same strength and both are afraid of the other side. So that is why, out of mutual fear, they start to talk to one another, especially in the nuclear field. And then we have a number of nuclear deals: START One, START Two, New START, SORT One, SORT Two.

So I believe probably professionalism is a better word for us to use. If we just can't establish trust - like Ronald Reagan said, "Trust but verify" - trust but verify means actually I do not trust you. What I want is to verify. That is a polite way of saying I don't trust you. So the stress is on verification.

And that is why I have proposed in my article in Foreign Affairs using this model: trust by talk. Since we do not trust each other, we need more talks. Maybe throughout all this kind of talks, we can become more professional in our mutual exchanges or interaction. So trust is not a precondition.

Keith 00:50:39

In Southeast Asia, there is a certain sense of ambiguity or ambivalence that the countries hold, as compared to maybe say the Africans, for example, in which they interact with China and the US. There is a sense that we want to be able to strategically balance between both powers.

Zhou Bo 00:51:04

I think ASEAN is doing quite well. I think almost like a grandmaster. You see, ASEAN has been held with its ASEAN centrality as strategy. Actually, it is conditional. Why is that? Because it depends on certain kind of rivalry among major powers, but not on all-out war among major powers. If there is war between China and US, centrality will be gone.

This is just like UN Secretary-General cannot be selected from any of the P5 countries because there is tension, because there is rivalry. So ASEAN countries would look more important because it is standing in between, and this gives them space for manoeuvre. But so far, ASEAN has been doing this quite well. I think I would say ASEAN looks impartial, and that is why it is successful. So ASEAN's centrality lies in impartiality.

Keith 00:52:16

Do you think there is a worry that ASEAN centrality might erode given the fact that we're just relatively a loose association of nations?

Zhou Bo 00:52:29

Well, I think so long as China and the United States have this intense but not totally broken relationship, you still have your place. You can still manage because I think ASEAN countries are using a very clever strategy of not picking sides but picking with issues. On this issue you're with China, on that issue you are with United States. So people never know which side you're really with. So I think that is a clever strategy, and that normally is the strategy of small countries - not only ASEAN but also some countries in the Southern Pacific or even in Africa.

Keith 00:53:13

So of all that we've talked about, should the world fear China?

Zhou Bo 00:53:22

I don't think the world should really fear China because I think the world should get used to a China that is strong, powerful, but not threatening. I think this is what I have suggested even for China, my own country - that China should portray an image of Tang Dynasty. Tang Dynasty is China's prime time. It is so powerful, yes, it is humble, and it is attractive. So that is a China that I would say is best for the world.

Keith 00:54:04

My last question to you is: if you were to give a piece of advice to any fresh graduate entering the working world, what would that be?

Zhou Bo 00:54:19

Never underestimate the seed that is already in your heart which has yet to grow. Take care of it. One day it will blossom.