Is India Asia's Next Great Power- Karthik Nachiappan

00:00 Introduction
01:03 How To Understand India
05:42 India's Core Interests
09:16 India's Strengths in a Multipolar World
13:02 Is India Obstructionist?
20:10 The India-Pakistan Conflict: A Historical Perspective
28:12 The Role of China in South Asia
33:31 India's Strategic Ambiguity
35:22 India's Economic Growth Challenges
43:35 India's Future Relationship with Singapore & Southeast Asia
49:25 Advice for Young Graduates

How To Understand India

Keith 00:01:03

Today, I'm joined by Dr. Karthik Nachiappan. He's a fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. His research expertise and focus is on Indian foreign policy, focused on geoeconomic issues. It is my extreme privilege to welcome him on the show.

Prof. Nachiappan, thank you for coming on.

Karthik 00:01:23

Thank you for the invitation.

Keith 00:01:25

I'd like to first ask an interesting question, which is: India wears many hats today. It's what some might say is the largest democracy in the world. It's a rising superpower, but it's also a very complex political animal, I guess. The question I have is, how should Southeast Asians understand India from being its neighbor?

Karthik 00:01:49

That's a great question to start off with, and a very hard one.

So historically, India and Southeast Asia have had deep links. There was a lot of migration from India to Southeast Asia and from Southeast Asia to India. Economically, culturally, and politically, there are deep linkages between Southeast Asia and India. If you look at the northeastern part of India, it's connected to Southeast Asia. So connectivity is a big aspect of how India has chosen to deal with Southeast Asia.

But if you look at the broader story of India and Southeast Asia, I would say it's one of high expectations that has not been met by outcomes. And it's the story that I think people like me living here in Singapore have always struggled with. How can India do more in Southeast Asia? How can it, given its size, its scale, its potential, its deep history, its international profile, its power—what can India do to meet or fulfill the obligations that a lot of Southeast Asian countries have?

For various reasons, I think India has not really met that obligation or that expectation. I think part of it has to do with the fact that India is a big country with big challenges. So domestically, the government has to deal with that initially before looking outward. So that's always been a problem.

Second, especially over the last 20-30 years, Southeast Asia has integrated deeply with China. Whether that's economically or in other ways, this is a region that's, in many ways, much closer to China than it is to any other power in the world. And I think the space that India would occupy, or would hope to occupy, is being covered by China. So it's always fighting for more space here in Southeast Asia.

And thirdly, there have been some initiatives. There was a lot of connectivity initiatives, especially from the Indian Northeast to, say, Thailand, Myanmar, and that part of the region, where there were some projects, infrastructure projects, that could connect both India and Southeast Asia, whether it's roads, highways, or ports. Some of those projects haven't really come to fruition for various reasons. So trade has lagged.

And the other issue is, in terms of security cooperation, I think again, India, given its neighborhood, given the challenges that it faces in its neighborhood in the subcontinent, it has had to deal with that. It's had to deal with China and Southeast Asia. It's had to deal with Pakistan. So I think that's, in some ways, has also constrained India from playing a much larger role in Southeast Asia security-wise.

But I think a lot of that is changing. A lot of that is changing because I think after a long time, India feels that it has a lot of equities in Southeast Asia that it can use to build its profile, to build its economy, to work much closely with certain Southeast Asian countries that have concerns with China, for example. India is also looking for more investment, more capital to drive its economic transformation.

So there is convergence now, and there are a lot more opportunities for India and Southeast Asia to do more. When Prime Minister Modi came into power, he introduced a policy called the Act East policy, which was for India to do much more in Southeast Asia, whether it's through connectivity, trade, investment, security, or technology. And I think there's interest, there's much more of an opening. I think what needs to happen now is the follow-through. It's execution.

And there is hope because some Southeast Asian countries are also worried about China, they're worried about the US, and they see an India that could play a constructive role in a competitive, contentious region. So things could be changing. I think they are. There are many ways in which India could help Southeast Asia more, and there are ways in which Southeast Asia can help India more. The proof is going to be in the pudding now.

India's Core Interests

Keith 00:06:12

If you could, give me a sense of your understanding of what India's core interests are, be it on the international stage or at home domestically.

Karthik 00:06:22

So I would say three main interests. First is the preservation of sovereignty, the protection of sovereignty and India's territorial integrity. India, as I just mentioned, has faced challenges on its borders over the last 75 years as an independent nation. It's faced challenges with respect to Pakistan, with whom it's fought four wars, with China on the other side of the border, again, with whom it's gone to war. And there have been a lot of skirmishes and conflicts over the last few years.

And it's had to deal with a lot of insurgencies in different parts of India, secessionary movements. So states trying to become their own countries. And so, sovereignty and territorial integrity is a core national interest for India. And it tries to protect it by modernizing its defense capabilities, by investing in its army, navy, internal security, and counter-terrorism. So how do we keep India's borders intact and safe? That's, I think, the primary and foremost core interest.

Second, I would say, is driving India's economic transformation. India is now the fifth largest economy. It's now, it's grown considerably over the last 30 years since reforms. But it's still largely a developing country. Per capita income is 2,700-2,800. So there's a lot of growth, but the growth is not being shared evenly within India. And so the government's responsibility is to ensure growth happens, that growth is inclusive, shared, and over time, per capita income grows as well.

So that's the second big interest. And third, I would say, in terms of foreign policy, given its security responsibilities and interests, and its economic interests, India needs to have a foreign policy that is fluid, that is, emphasizes freedom of action, that prioritizes space, that gives India the ability to work with different countries where and how it can to advance its own interests.

So India does not enter into alliances. India does not want to get bound by any kind of a broader framework that would constrain itself from acting in its core interests. Some people call it strategic autonomy. This was an extension of a long legacy of non-alignment which India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, instituted. But the core idea here is that the Indian government has a foreign policy which has space and which is nimble and agile and is able to advance its own interests in a world that's getting more and more complicated.

And now I would say a big part of that strategic economy is ensuring that your foreign policy is able to advance a world that is truly multipolar, and where India is also one such pole. It's a power within Asia that's able to work with other major powers in the world to advance its interests.

So those are the three core interests that I think India has.

India's Strengths in a Multipolar World

Keith 00:09:46

It's interesting you touch on the point of the multipolar configuration of the world. I think a lot of the guests that I've had on have also intimated that they were making that transition. And with each country or each power that becomes a pole, there is a certain strength to it. There is a certain part that pulls countries into their orbit or into areas of cooperation. So my question to you would then be, what do you think are India's strengths that would serve it well as a pole in this region?

Karthik 00:10:18

It's a continental power in Asia. It's a continental power with a sizable army, navy, and defense capabilities that is able to protect the Indian Ocean. And the Indian Ocean is absolutely critical to global trade. It's absolutely critical to trade in the Indo-Pacific, trade that flows from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and East Asia. All of that goes through the Indian Ocean. And that's India's backyard, and it needs to be able to ensure that that remains free and open. And it's been investing in defense, army, and naval capabilities to ensure that the broader maritime region is safe and open.

India is a sizable economy. It's the fifth largest economy now, it's growing. In aggregate terms, it has a sizable effect on global trade. It has a sizable effect on global technology trends. It wants more investment to flow into India for various reasons as different industries and sectors grow. And this government, especially the Modi government, has been trying to champion an India that's open for investment and that's fundamentally focused on economic growth over the long term. So that's an advantage, that's a strength.

And in terms of foreign policy, I would say that India has always punched above its weight at international organizations in terms of international politics, at championing certain ideas and norms that defend and protect the interests of developing countries. It's done that at the UN for over 50 years, for over 75 years. And I think it's continuing to do that to ensure that a lot of countries in the Global South, their interests are protected, their ideas are voiced, especially as rules and norms are made around issues like climate, technology, maritime security, so on and so forth.

So in many ways, India is an important country. It's an important power in Asia. For a lot of Western countries now, they see India as a counterweight to China. They see India as a country, as a democracy, as a power that they have to invest in to balance China. They're worried about an Asia that's falling under Chinese dominance, and they see investing and banking on India, India's long-term growth, and its potential as the best way to challenge that. And I think for them, India is a long-term bet. It's a bet that a lot of American administrations have considerably invested in. It's a bet that the EU is now really focused on as it's facing trouble from both China and the United States.

And I think even from Southeast Asia, India is a country, is a large, as I said, sizable country that they can bring into the fold to ensure that a balance exists in this part of the world.

Is India Obstructionist?

Keith 00:13:31

There's a point that you made earlier about India being a champion of the Global South or developing countries. In your book, "Can India Negotiate?", you kind of point out that there is a perception that India is being obstructionist in from perspectives of other countries or maybe the developed countries. And you point out that that could be wrong, or maybe that's a misperception.

Karthik 00:13:52

At international negotiations, countries have to defend their interests. And if the rules that are being negotiated at different forums and different multilateral settings, if they are not meaningfully advancing the interests of that particular country, then the negotiators have a responsibility to say no, to resist some aspects of that rule-making, and to somehow influence the actual negotiations to fit their own interests.

And this is what India has done for over 75 years. And from an Indian perspective, what they are doing is defending and protecting their own interests at those negotiations to ensure that international rules and international treaties does not in any way constrain India's ability to protect its borders, its territory, its security, and does not affect India's ability to grow and develop over time.

But that occasionally also does mean that India might not sign on to certain rules or it might object or resist to ensure that, again, the rules broadly fit what India's interests are and what they wanted to be.

From the position of other countries, this can be seen as obstructionist. This can be seen as India playing a, being a veto player, trying to delay, trying to trying to stall negotiations at these international forums. A case in point is trade, for example, at the WTO and GATT and world trade negotiations over time.

India has historically been protectionist. It's been protectionist because it feels that it does not have an economy and does not have industries and firms that are, that can compete with other countries and other firms in other countries effectively.

So the logical thing for them, for the government to do, is to ensure that these firms in India have enough space to grow, to produce, and eventually over time become much more competitive. How do they do that? They have to have tariffs. They have to have different kinds of trade restrictions, import quotas, that sometimes do not meet the standards of the WTO. So India has to block certain rule-making processes there.

So that's an example that's almost always given. But from an Indian perspective, what's happening is that look, we need time for our firms and industries to grow such that they become competitive and they can export different kinds of goods and services over time.

Until that happens, we're going to, we're going to protect our interests. We're going to not sign on or not concede or yield to rules that others are signing on to.

This is not obstructionist from an Indian point of view, but it is from another country's point of view. But I think over time as India has grown—and this is, this aspect also comes out in the latter half of my book—is in areas where India sees its economic and security interests advanced by those negotiations, India is willing to sign on to those rules.

It's just a matter of whether what's being discussed in Geneva or New York or any other multilateral body advances India's core interests. And when that, if that happens, I think India will be willing to work with them.

Keith 00:17:42

Where does negotiation come in in that process? Because I assume that even many countries would take a similar frame, but perhaps they do not have the same heft and weight that India has. So, then it goes back to the question: how does India negotiate in those cases?

Karthik 00:18:01

Over time, as India has become much more prosperous, as India has grown into a larger economy, its interests have also shifted. They've changed.

So in some of these areas, India has to lead some of these rule-making processes. One example I can share is on climate issues, on climate change.

When global negotiations started on climate change in the '90s, India was of the firm view that because of its own history, because of the fact that India was not a large emitter over its history and did not contribute to global emissions as much as the United States or Europe, that India should not be compelled to reduce its carbon emissions over time.

But over the last 10, 15 years, it's realized that independent of its own emissions trajectory, that doing more on climate change at home helps and advances India's own economic and security interests. So that means India, in certain cases—climate—has had to lead, has had to come up with new ideas on different kinds of projects and rules.

The clearest example here is the creation of the International Solar Alliance. And this is a solar power multilateral—it's a, it's a, I think it has like 110 countries or something. And it was designed as a multilateral body to advance solar power worldwide.

Now, this is an area in which India has clear strengths. And since this was not being covered at the UN framework on climate change, India felt that it could actually lead on this issue, create this new body, and have other countries sign on to this initiative to advance the cause of solar power worldwide, in which it has a clear strength.

So things have changed over time. There are some areas in which India is still not willing to do that. It's not willing to lead or engage or drive some rule-making and norm-driving processes. In other areas like climate, technology, there is a clear interest, given where India's economy is and India's security interests are, to do much more. And that's what's been happening.

The India-Pakistan Conflict: A Historical Perspective

Keith 00:20:39

The issue of sovereignty seems to figure quite heavily these days, mainly because, I mean, as we all know, we're now in, like, 2025, mid-year, through mid-year of 2025, there's been another conflict that emerged or broke out between India and Pakistan.

Help me understand, like, what are the, perhaps if we were to kind of understand this conflict not just as an incident, but perhaps a reflection of a systemic trend, what is it beyond just the conflict that we should look out for in trying to understand India's tense relationship with Pakistan?

Karthik 00:21:20

So this is a legacy of colonialism. It's a relic, it's a legacy that the British left behind with borders that were not clearly demarcated over time. And India and Pakistan have fought four wars so far over that particular border in Kashmir.

Kashmir, as we know, is split into three. One is the Indian-administered Kashmir, one is a Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and China controls a certain part of it. When this, five years ago, the Modi government removed that special provision allotted to Kashmir through Article 370, which essentially made it a state within the Union of India. I think that was also to remove any kind of objections from Pakistan that this is contested territory. For India, Kashmir is an integral part of the country. India also thinks that Pakistan, what's now the POK, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, is also an integral part of India and will one day return to the Indian Union.

Now, over time, this conflict over Kashmir has brought both India and Pakistan to war. What's changed over the last 30 years is that India's power relative to Pakistan has grown dramatically.

What that has meant is that from a Pakistani perspective, it's very difficult to fight a conventional war with India to reclaim this border, the state, any part of Kashmir.

So their strategy has essentially been to use different kinds of proxy groups, terrorist groups to support terrorist groups to foment instability in Kashmir and to destabilize it. Because that, they feel that is the only approach, the most, the best way to ensure that that they have some stake in this conflict still.

The other part of it which is problematic is that the nuclear element here ensures that India also, in some ways, cannot react through a conventional war because for the fear that this could potentially lead to a nuclear conflagration or a nuclear war.

So what's been happening over the last three decades or so is you see these different terrorist incidents happening over time, from '99, I would even go back a little bit more. But especially from '99, there was a war in Kargil, and then since then, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, and then the last few years, there have been many terrorist attacks in India by terrorist organizations who have allegedly been supported by the Pakistani military.

India, this is not a problem that India wants to deal with. Obviously, India sees its trajectory as going on a different level. It's a rising power. It has an economy that is in the top five now. It has a population that is hoping for change, that is really moving forward very fast. And whereas if you look at Pakistan's course and trajectory, it's been going the other way.

So this is not an issue or a problem that India wants to deal with over the long term. But I feel like they're compelled to deal with it because that's the only way in which Pakistan can prosecute this issue with India.

So over time, you see these different terrorist activities blowing up, and India responding and then Pakistan responding with the hope that eventually it doesn't become a nuclear issue. And that's what happened last week as well. There was, there was a terrorist attack, there was a retaliation from India directed at certain terrorist groups in Pakistan, and then Pakistan retaliated.

But the big difference last week, I would say, was that India went a little bit further in targeting groups deeper into Pakistan than they have over the last little while. And I think if these activities do continue, then there will be renewed questions on whether a nuclear war is possible between both countries. But this is a problem that India does not want to deal with, and it has to deal with every few years because Pakistan is waging this war against them using these different terrorist groups.

Keith 00:26:22

Do you think this is a wicked problem that's essentially intractable? Do you see a way out in which that this tension could be ameliorated over time?

Karthik 00:26:34

Pakistan claims that this issue, the only real solution to this issue has to be an international mediation. So have both countries sit down with other partners to decide the future of Kashmir. India rejects that. For India, Kashmir is, as Imentioned, an integral part of the Indian Union. And the only question for India is when they get back the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as well. And for them, it's a bilateral issue. They want to deal with it with the Pakistani authorities.

The problem has been over the last 15-20 years, especially in the last 10 years under this government, is that the Pakistani army over time has gotten more and more powerful relative to the civilian government in Pakistan. And India, this government, has not, is not in a position or does not want to be put in a position where it's talking to the civilian government in Pakistan when the power is held by the military. The power to conduct these different kinds of terrorist attacks is in the hands of the military, then there's no purpose in engaging and talking to the civilian government.

So what India wants to do is talk to, is to talk with Pakistan, whoever in Pakistan, to deal with this issue of terrorism, this cross-border terrorism first, before they can come up with a broader solution to what's happening. But obviously, that's not happening because Pakistan thinks of this not as a problem related to terrorism, but as a problem related to Kashmir. And so we're stuck, and we can't really move forward.

The Role of China in South Asia

Keith 00:28:19

Will that be something that will continue to hamper India as it seeks to become a major power in the region, especially given the fact that although it's a very fast-growing economy, it is still lagging but it is still trying to achieve a much more equitable distribution of growth?

Karthik 00:28:41

So the problem, the other angle, the element of the Pakistani problem for India is that Pakistan derives most of its support, military, economic support, from China. And this is something that India is aware of, this is a reality. And so any potential war against Pakistan would also have high levels of involvement and support from China.

And when you put Pakistan and China together as one unit, then I think it limits the kinds of options that India has to deal and address this problem. And I think this is, so that's what makes this hard. That's what makes this somewhat intractable for India, given India's own power imbalance with China, and the fact that the Chinese have been helping Pakistan with weapons, with military support, with economic support, that allows them to engage in this low-grade warfare with India.

And so over the long term, I think the only way out is for India to also in some way reduce the power imbalance with China. That would allow it to deal with both these different fronts independently and capably. And I think that's a long-term process which can I think only be achieved through high growth over the decades and growth that's translated into military power that allows India to deal with both China and Pakistan.

Keith 00:30:22

I spoke to Taimur from DBS and he said that, you know, in the recent years, Sino-India relationship has started to become warmer as opposed to maybe the pre-2020s. But yet, India and China still remain, still has a very ambivalent relationship with each other. Do you think that warming of relations is something that it's only a change in the weather but not the climate?

Karthik 00:30:49

So I don't, I wouldn't claim it to be warming right now. I think it's still quite problematic from an Indian perspective. It's still quite, it's, it's, it's stuck.

And I think the last five years, if you go back to the border skirmishes in 2020, and which was for the first time since 1975 that you saw casualties across the Indian-Chinese border. And and you saw fighting, right, actual warfare and fighting and people dying.

The and then since then, India has reacted in several ways. It's blocked TikTok. It's blocked dozens and hundreds of Chinese applications. It's frozen Chinese investments into India. It's blocked Chinese visas. It's, so the response, a big part of the response has been economic. Because trade still continues to grow, and over the last five years, even as hostilities and even as the kind of political and security relationship has deteriorated, trade has gone up, trade has continued to grow. And right now it's a major imbalance against India.

So the challenge for India, I think, over the long term with China is going to be, how do we reduce our dependence economically while at the same time building up our security and defense capabilities to deal with China's what it looks like, um, military size and presence right now.

And I think over the last 10, 15 years, that power imbalance has grown against India's favor. I think right now, India's, I think China is four times as large as India economically. Military spending is, it's way more than India. It has a lot more influence in Southeast Asia, in South Asia, in Pakistan, and in dealing with other countries that are also in, that have some sway over India.

So this is a strategic challenge for the long term. I think what you've seen over the last six months is that as India realized that it needs to grow its exports, it needs to trade more, that would mean importing more raw materials and goods and commodities from China to enable India to export more. So you see cooling, you see warming, sorry, you see warming in some areas of economic engagement because I think that helps and serves India's interest right now.

But it will continue to do that while building its defense capabilities, while building its military and naval capabilities, and while working with the US, while working with Japan, with Australia, with other countries in Southeast Asia that have similar concerns with China. And I think there's going to be a heavy dose of both cooperation on the economic side and competition on the military side.

India's Strategic Ambiguity

Keith 00:34:03

Perhaps India is probably the most strategically ambiguous power that that that we will know, because at the one hand, yes, you point out that they have very close ties with the US, but at the same time, even with, for example, the war in Ukraine, India remains close to Russia. And there is this ambiguity, strategic ambiguity that they purposefully embraces.

Karthik 00:34:24

What you, I mean, what you said as structural strategic ambiguity, India would claim it's strategic autonomy, right? It's having the ability and the right to not be swayed by any other external power, not to follow their lead in deciding against your interests. So Ukraine is a case in point, right?

Russia has been a long-standing strategic partner for India, both militarily and diplomatically. So it made no sense for India to challenge and condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine because the United States and Europe were compelling it to do so. I think India sees a lot of value in the Russia relationship because of the challenge it faces from China. It needs a strong, it needs an independent and autonomous Russia to deal with China. And I think there are interests which are compelling India to be much more independent, right, in determining some of these choices to what's happening in the international system like Ukraine.

But that creates complications which it has to deal with over time. And going back to my initial comment about having this space and the freedom to do that is absolutely fundamental given India's own interests.

India's Economic Growth Challenges

Keith 00:35:52

There is indeed a desire to grow economically and to, you know, perhaps compensate for the asymmetry that it sees with China, for example, in terms of its economy. What are some of the structural problems that you see that, you know, India needs to overcome?

Karthik 00:36:08

It's so India's long-term problem, a lot of its long-term strategic issues and challenges can be addressed through sustained economic growth.

There was an Indian thinker who once said that the best foreign policy is 8% growth. Growth opens up a lot of different options diplomatically. Growth opens up doors for India to work with partners in other parts of the world. Growth opens up options for India to finance its military and defense to deal with threats and risks that it faces.

But that growth over time has been difficult for India. And I think the long-term strategic challenge for India is to ensure that its economic growth remains inclusive, shared, which means that its per capita income, which is very low right now, considerably increases over time, and that the growth is not jobless, as you've seen over the last 5, 10 years, but in fact, all of India is part of India's own growth story.

The biggest economic challenge that India faces right now is trying to come up with, I mean, trying to come up with a viable strategy for manufacturing. Hundreds of millions of people who are currently in that middle layer of Indian society could be absorbed into manufacturing if there was a viable, sound, and thriving manufacturing sector, which there isn't.

Over the decades, India has in some ways skipped, it's actually leaped the natural economic modernization strategy. So countries generally go from agriculture to manufacturing and then services. India, for various reasons, kind of leapfrogged it by going straight from agriculture to services.

So its services industry, which is, which has been holding and driving its growth for the last 15, 20 years, still contributes about 50% of India's GDP while absorbing only 5% of its population. The rest are in the informal economy or in agriculture.

Now, the challenge for this government and for most Indian governments has been, how do we absorb that massive labor to create a viable and thriving manufacturing industry that can export over time, much like what's happened in Southeast Asia, much like what happened in China and what's happening now in Vietnam and Bangladesh.

But for various reasons, that hasn't happened. And I think this government, through various policies, incentives, is trying to revive manufacturing. And I think that's the big question, economic question, which could pay strategic dividends over time if India's growth continues to be 8 to 10% over the next decade, which is what it requires to not just thrive economically but deal with its different strategic challenges.

Keith 00:39:19

What other bottlenecks that you think that has prevented India to industrialize itself maybe not maybe not to the extent of China, but for example, to become a sizable industrial or manufacturing economy?

Karthik 00:39:31

So the biggest blind spot, I think, for most governments over the last 25 years, Indian governments, has been a lack of focus on two areas: health and education. Spending on health and education has largely not increased over that time period.

But instead, what the government has done is, especially what this government has done, has make massive investments in improving infrastructure. So if you go to India now, the roads are much better than they've ever been. Ports, highways, airports. There's been a lot of improvement in terms of digital infrastructure, in terms of creating new ways for financial inclusion for citizens.

So the government has done a lot of things right broadly for the economy, but they've not done very well in terms of training people so over time they can move, as I said, from that agriculture to manufacturing and services. They get the skills that are required to find good jobs that over time leads to rising incomes and livelihoods. That's always been the biggest problem in India. And if, and if the government does pay considerable attention to health and education, to social policy, to ensuring that hundreds of millions of people in India are able to skill themselves, find better jobs, make more money, create more firms, which would then have an amplifying effect on the larger economy as a whole. So fixing health and education is a good start.

But the problem in India is that health and education is constitutionally a responsibility that states have to deal with. So there has to, there have to be political tradeoffs and issues that have to be also dealt with and fixed in this matter. And this government has not been very effective at dealing with those kinds of tradeoffs when working with states for these kinds of issues. But I think it has to do that if India is will eventually grow consistently over time.

Keith 00:41:53

Why do you think that this Modi administration has not been paying attention to this as much as they should?

Karthik 00:42:00

They've focused on the big picture. They've really focused on, as I said, infrastructure, constructing a national infrastructure across India, roads, ports, highways, airports. They've placed a considerable amount of importance on digital infrastructure, ensuring that citizens have bank accounts, citizens are able to get payments, subsidies from the government, but also transact with one another.

They've been very good at what I would call welfare. Again, ensuring that people have access to subsidies, access to energy, gas cylinders, toilets. So a lot of these things which people need, especially the poorest people, they've been very good at these kinds of things.

But social policy, as I mentioned, it requires working with states across the country. And there are 28 states in India with different linguistic, cultural, economic, social backgrounds. And it's not always easy to work with states that are also governed by parties that are not from your own party. I would say for various reasons, this government has not been much, much more open to working with other parties. That's what is going to require because India is a federal system. India is a federal system which is governed by many different parties, and many different parties that control states who have massive powers on social policy which are going to have to eventually address to deal with India's structural gaps in its system.

That's a long-term challenge, not just for this government, but for any government that comes after it.

India's Future Relationship with Singapore & Southeast Asia

Keith 00:44:05

If I go back earlier to your earliest point which you made, which is that Singapore, not just Singapore, Southeast Asia and India's relationship has been characterized by with great promise and yet a sort of under-delivery. My question to you would then be, if we were to look ahead in the coming few years or decades, where are the areas or frontiers for growth where Southeast Asia and India could collaborate on that would create win-win outcomes for both sides or both parties?

Karthik 00:44:40

I think that's a big priority for this government. This government is looking to make strategic partnerships not just with countries in Southeast Asia but other parts of the world, as I mentioned, with Europe, with other countries that are in the Middle East, in South America.

If you come back to Southeast Asia, maybe I'll start with Singapore first. I think Singapore historically has been India's pathway to Southeast Asia. It's through Singapore that India has come to understand Southeast Asia over the last 20 years. How it runs, who operates, who thrives, how these other countries are working within the ASEAN and independently. Singapore has been the vector through which India has approached and dealt with Southeast Asia. And I think that will remain the case.

India is, Singapore is India's most important strategic partner in Southeast Asia, especially economically. Last couple of years, a few years ago, Singapore was the top source of FDI into India, which is astonishing given the population and the scale and Singapore's economy and India. But I think that goes to show the fact of Singapore's importance as a regional investment and trading hub and where India fits into that larger picture, especially as China becomes much more powerful in Southeast Asia.

With Singapore, I think there are a lot of opportunities in terms of services. And I think this, both governments are focusing on that. Whether it's digital infrastructure, fintech, blockchain, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, aviation, health, climate, green technologies, I think these are areas in which both Singaporean capital and technology can really make a difference in India. And the Indian market, the Indian economy gives Singapore another option to grow over the long term, besides what it has in China, the US, and in other parts of Southeast Asia.

India is a long-term promising economic answer to some of your issues. And I think over time, as the Indian economy grows, as the Indian economy becomes much more formalized, it will demand more investment. And Singapore has that. Singapore has technology and expertise. So even in areas like urbanization, smart cities, they're India will look to tap a lot of expertise that lies in Singapore.

So I think in the short to long to mid-term, the rate of growth in the in the Indian economy and how far the Indian economy is digitalizing, there's a lot of scope for Singapore.

With some of the other Southeast Asian countries, I think it would depend on the size and nature of their economy and how they're willing to engage with India. I think Vietnam, for example, is competing with India in this quest to become a manufacturing hub. But on the other hand, Vietnam is really interested in acquiring India's defense equipment. And India is becoming much more of a defense supplier for other countries in the region as it figures out how to produce arms for itself. So Vietnam and the Philippines, for example, both having to deal with different security challenges with China, are looking to India for arms, are looking to India for military support. The Philippines got, received some missiles, I think, last year. Again, in this broader competition, India is playing different roles given its own capabilities and interests and how it can advance its interests and that of other countries in Southeast Asia.

There's there are a lot of opportunities with Indonesia on the maritime security front, because Indonesia and India share a maritime, broader maritime region and a space. And both are looking at ways in which how they can secure that, whether it's dealing with illegal fisheries, piracy, other kinds of maritime problems. That's bringing India and Indonesia together, and trade between India and Indonesia is actually growing too. I think it was about $45 billion last year.

So I think India has the potential to, as I said, be a long-term market for Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian economies. For some countries, it's a defense partner. For other countries, it's an important maritime security partner. And I think India has to build these different partnerships over time. And you're going to see much more attention from India because of that.

Advice for Young Graduates

Keith 00:49:54

I now come to my final question. If there was one piece of advice that you have to give to a fresh graduate—and I know this is veering of the all deep and heavy conversation so far, but this is a podcast for the young people as well—what advice would you give?

Karthik 00:50:10

I would say just read. Spend a lot of time reading, getting—if you're interested in India, there's no better way of getting to know how the country is moving, changing, evolving, adapting, by reading about India. And it also helps by traveling, right? I think travel opens you up to that particular country or region, and it complements reading very well.

Whereas if you're really interested in kind of studying India or thinking about India and making that a career, then I think reading does help, but using that reading to write as well. I think that's very, very important. And the more you read, the more your mind processes and makes sense of what you're reading, and then you will think about questions that you're interested in, that you want to ask, and that you want to pursue intellectually. And over time, that exposes you to different, different ideas, different ways of thinking about the world, just to make sense of whatever you're trying to understand better.

So, I know it's boring, it takes a lot of time, but just sitting down and reading and thinking every day is probably the thing I do the most and the thing I recommend the most to young people.

Keith 00:51:41

So if there was one book you have to recommend and one place that you have to go in India, where would it be?

Karthik 00:51:46

Oh, wow, that's a hard question. In terms of books, there are so many great books, but the book that I always go back to, to understand the India of today, modern India, is a book called "The Idea of India" by historian Sunil Khilnani. It's about, I think, 25 years old now, but I think it's still, the beauty of that book is that it's able to boil and distill the complexities of India into a story that is relevant no matter when you read it. And that covers issues like India's history, its politics, its economy, its foreign policy, and its future. And I go back to that book every few years or so, and I still find it not just relevant, but appropriate to understand and explain where India is and where it's going.

And in terms of a place, that's an equally hard question. I, the place that I keep going back to the most for work, obviously, is is New Delhi. I think, I still think it's the most fascinating city in India, not just because historically it was, there's so much of the past and the history that's still architecturally present in Delhi. But at the same time, it's the seat of power, it's the place where almost all of the important conversations on India's current and future take place. And it's the place where a lot of the important discussions and debates, like the one we've had today, occur. You can go anywhere in India, it's so diverse and so different, but just to get a real understanding of where India is right now and where it's going, I would say Delhi.

Keith 00:53:54

All right, with that recommendation, Prof Nachiappan, thank you for coming on.

Karthik 00:53:58

Thank you.