Why Southeast Asia Needs America - Professor Joseph Liow

Professor Joseph Chinyong Liow is one of Singapore’s leading scholars on international affairs, known for his incisive analysis of Southeast Asian politics.

He serves as the Dean of the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), where he currently holds the prestigious Tan Kah Kee Chair in Comparative and International Politics.

He was the former Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at NTU.

Beyond Singapore, Professor Liow has made a significant impact globally. He was the inaugural Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., where he also served as a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program.

TIMESTAMPS:
00:00 Trailer & Intro
01:21 Defining Great Powers
05:33 Cold War Dynamics in Southeast Asia
08:41 Formation of ASEAN and US Engagement
15:05 ASEAN's Response to Changing Landscapes
19:44 Vietnam As A Case-Study
26:58 American Unipolar Moment
31:55 Is The US Values-Driven?
38:49 Do Southeast Asian States Even Want America Here?
44:56 Singapore's Role in U.S.-China Relations
53:12 ASEAN's Future: Collective Action in a Changing Landscape
54:49 Advice For Graduating Students

Keith 01:21
If we look at the world today, there seems to be this idea of great power rivalry, but most people don't really know what elements create a great power. Perhaps you can first help us by laying out the definition of what a great power is.

Joseph Liow 01:34
By definition, great powers are in possession of certain elements and instruments of power of a magnitude that sets them apart from practically every other country in the world. If we think about great powers today, the first two that come to mind are the United States and China. Both are very large countries. A case can be made throughout history that great powers tend to be very large countries.

Beyond that, we are talking about countries that have a significant amount of military power that allows them to project quite far beyond their shorelines. This is very clear and evident in the case of the United States. In fact, you see it now. This is an ability and capacity that China is also starting to build up. Although they haven't really exercised it in recent times, most analysts will agree that they are in possession of that capability, and they are certainly ramping it up.

In addition to that, there's economic power. The United States and China are two of the largest, number one and number two, economies in the world. They are considerably larger than Germany, Japan, India, or whoever else is coming up behind them. In the case of the United States, it's not just the size of its economy, but the fact that the US currency continues to be the dominant, preferred global reserve currency. That affords the United States a lot of influence, a lot of latitude.

So, these are one side of the characteristics of a great power. There's another side which people call soft power. This is a term that the late Professor Joseph Nye coined. It is the ability to influence, cajole, and persuade other countries to be more sympathetic or even to align their behavior and interests with yours. The United States has a large reservoir of that, in no small part due to the very extensive and very effective diplomacy that they have been able to conduct over the years and decades. Other instruments like USAID, unfortunately, that particular institution is going through a very difficult time now, but nevertheless, in the past, it was a very important avenue, in addition to all these elements of hard power. China is, of course, trying to build that up as well. Over the years, for example, they have established Confucius Institutes all over the world, including in Singapore. The idea with these institutes is to familiarize local populations with not just the Chinese language, but Chinese culture, Chinese history, and a particular narrative around it. This narrative suggests that China has a very rich and very long civilizational identity that, according to them, has been peaceful and certainly constructive in global affairs and things like that. So there's a hard power element, a soft power element, and a geographic element to it as well.

Keith 05:33
Could you help me understand the fundamental logic during the Cold War, in which the different administrations, be it Democrats or Republicans, viewed Southeast Asia?

Joseph Liow 05:41
The Cold War was also a great power competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike today, I would argue that at that time, there was a very sharp ideological dimension to it. It was the capitalist free world versus the communist system.

In addition to that, as far as the United States is concerned, their grand strategy during the entire Cold War period was what they called containment. It was an idea coined by George Kennan. The idea was simply that it was incumbent on the United States to contain and block the growth and spread of communism anywhere in the world. So, therein lie the seeds of a post-World War II, expensive, global outlook towards the world and the role of the US in it.

Together with containment was the concept of the Domino Theory. The idea was simply that if one country falls to communism, it would have a domino effect, placing other countries at risk. If they fall, then the next country, and so on and so forth. This was particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia. This is why the question of Vietnam and the war in Vietnam, the US commitment in Vietnam, was predicated on the assumption that if Vietnam, and by extension Indochina (Cambodia, Laos), were to fall, then Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia would follow. That was the rationale for the United States to try to hold the line in Vietnam and explained their commitment.

Of course, we all know the outcome of the Vietnam War. In hindsight, we know that the Domino Theory didn't quite materialize, or at least, before it could materialize over time, you had the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction—not wholesale, because there are still communist and Leninist countries around, primarily China and Vietnam—but nevertheless, the significant pushback of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed that configuration significantly. But at that time, obviously, no one knew this was going to happen.

Keith 08:41
When you think about the formation of ASEAN, it started as a very pro-US organization. I remember reading how China and Vietnam were denouncing it as a neocolonialist plot. At the start, did ASEAN's formation crystallize the idea that Southeast Asia was a region the US wanted to engage with, outside of Vietnam?

Joseph Liow 08:55
It was pro-US in the sense that it was anti-communist. The founding members of ASEAN at that time—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore—were all governed by clearly anti-communist leadership. Indonesia was interesting because it had just come out of a very difficult time in terms of its bloody transition between Sukarno and Suharto, which also brought an end to the confrontation. Underlying the destabilizing developments in Indonesia before this transition was Sukarno's flirtation with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). At any rate, by the time ASEAN was formed, it was a coalition of anti-communist governments, and therefore, they worked closely with the United States.

Of course, ASEAN's main purpose at that time was not so much to collectively engage external powers as it was to have a platform for the stabilization of relations among the five themselves. There were many differences: territorial disputes, and the lingering effects of confrontation. So, there was a more immediate priority in terms of the relationships among the five, and trying to establish some mechanism or vehicle for them to manage their differences. Differences still exist today, but the question is having a mechanism to manage them. That was the primary role of ASEAN then, and it remains the primary role of ASEAN today.

Regarding the United States, because of their containment policy, the question of where Southeast Asia fit into their larger grand strategy at that time was fairly straightforward for them. They saw in Vietnam a communist-led insurgency that needed to be put down. The reality, as we know in hindsight, is far more complex. There has always been a debate, at least after the Vietnam War, whether it was truly a communist insurgency, or Vietnamese nationalism, and Vietnam's long history of fighting against foreign entities by way of colonialism, which was trying to shape Vietnam. But at that time, for the Americans, it was very clear that it was against communism, and they had to do something about it.

What that created was a very narrow, shall we say, task-oriented approach. So, the US was throwing in a lot of resources. At some point, it tipped over, because we know today that eventually, American society refused to accept that narrative as far as Vietnam and America's commitment in Vietnam were concerned. Because of internal dynamics and the change of sentiment internally in the United States, it became politically more and more difficult for the US leadership to sustain that effort, to sustain that war in Vietnam. This subsequently led to the withdrawal of the United States.

Following that, the hangover of Vietnam, and by extension, the US role in Southeast Asia, became something that worried many countries in the region, especially the anti-communist countries. They felt that the one major bulwark against communism, the United States, had retrenched from Southeast Asia. It was like a bad dream; they didn't want anything to do with Southeast Asia. In a sense, we were left to our own devices.

Joseph Liow 15:05
Fast forward to today, ASEAN finds itself in that same situation and has to ask itself that same question: The landscape is changing. Are we going to allow ourselves to be buffeted by the changes, or are we going to try our level best to come together to plot a path out of this difficult quandary we're in?

Keith 15:52
So what path did they chart, knowing there would be a power vacuum with the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia?

Joseph Liow 16:02
A number of things happened during the Cambodian crisis in the 1980s. There was a lot of concern, certainly on the part of Thailand, again, due to the Domino Theory. In fact, in the late 70s and early 80s, ASEAN was, to some extent, split on how they perceived the threat coming from the north. Few people talk about it today, but at that time, Indonesia and Malaysia were basically of the view that the bigger concern for them was not so much Vietnam, but China, the PRC. Of course, at that time, the relationships both these countries had with China were very different from today. On the other hand, Thailand and Singapore were of the view that the immediate concern was the situation in Kampuchea and Vietnam's involvement there. So, the concern was Vietnam.

This was a major discussion. In fact, in 1980, or perhaps 1981, Indonesia and Malaysia released their own statement, which they called the Kuantan Statement or Kuantan Doctrine. It implicitly identified China, and not Vietnam, as the main security challenge for Southeast Asia at that time. So, there was some concern that ASEAN had different and even opposite perceptions about the security challenges they faced. But through the diplomacy of ASEAN's first generation leaders, they managed to align themselves.

That then led to the question of how to manage this challenge. A lot of effort was placed by ASEAN, collectively, to make sure that the question of Kampuchea was always internationally visible. This was because ASEAN realized that to resolve this problem, it could not be resolved by the five ASEAN members themselves. It had to involve external powers and the international community. So, ASEAN collectively lobbied, whether it was the UN or other multilateral platforms at the time, to ensure that the issue of Kampuchea was on the table.

However, the significant change was the fall of the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union collapsed—once Afghanistan basically drained the blood, literally and figuratively, out of the Soviet Union—Vietnam lost a major patron state during that period. When the situation changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese outlook on its interests and how to pursue them in the region changed as well. That set Vietnam on a path of reconciliation with the rest of Southeast Asia, with ASEAN. And not just reconciliation, but membership in ASEAN, to the point that Vietnam is now seen as one of the critical members of ASEAN. ASEAN is an association of equal standing among all its members. But within that, it's quite clearly seen that Vietnam, because of its size, location, history, and potential, plays an especially important role in regionalism today.

Keith 19:44
You mentioned that the Vietnamese pay very close attention to Ukraine, mainly because they see themselves as constantly having to balance between managing China and the US. A former government official once shared with me that a part of Vietnam's domestic politics is always knowing when to be pro-China and when to be anti-China. You can never be too friendly with China. What kind of perspective informs Vietnam's decisions within ASEAN?

Joseph Liow 20:17
First, I will say, with regards to this thing about straddling the US and China, it's not unique to Vietnam. All the countries in Southeast Asia, many other countries in the world have to do that as well. Of course, they do that in different ways. Their interests vis-à-vis the US and China may differ, depending on specific issues. And it also depends on their history and their culture.

So, in the case of Vietnam, for example, you have a situation where, on the one hand, there's very strong alignment and a very strong relationship at an ideological level, at a party-to-party level. Certainly, as far as I know, the Chinese never fail to remind the Vietnamese of that, and the Vietnamese accept and understand that. On the other hand, Vietnam and China have a very long, complex history. Depending on your interpretation of history, some people will say that at some point, parts of Vietnam were actually under China. But at the same time, there were many periods where the Vietnamese resisted China. Even as that is happening, the cultural influence from China over different periods has been very strong as well. So, it's a very complex history.

Underlying that history is a very strong sense of Vietnamese nationalism, that it is by no stretch of the imagination a satellite of China or ever part of China or anything to that effect. So, that has to be balanced. Alongside that is also some practical realities. Vietnam has a very strong economic relationship with China. If you look at the Mekong region, the Mekong River has been very critical, continues to be critical for Vietnamese society, especially the communities that exist around the Mekong River. But geographically, Vietnam is what we call a lower riparian state, whereas China is an upper riparian state. So, the waters that flow down the Mekong to Vietnam—which provides the irrigation, provides the fisheries and things like that for Vietnam—those waters flow through China first. So, when China starts to dam the Mekong for their own interests, whatever the reason may be, it affects the flow of water, which affects the seasonal access to water, which affects harvests and crops, and things like that. That's a geographic reality.

So, Vietnam finds itself in a situation where it is—I wouldn't say at the mercy, but it is certainly at a disadvantage in terms of managing those waters as far as the geography is concerned. We also know that Vietnam has a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands, where it is the only Southeast Asian claimant vis-à-vis the Paracels. China, of course, is a claimant as well. Taiwan, you know, anyway, they also feature in that equation. So, you have these differences, you have these disputes on the one hand, but you have an economic relationship that is increasingly important for Vietnam, and a very good, very strong economic relationship predicated on mutual interest. So, here you see the difficulty, the challenge of trying to balance.

Then, of course, the United States. From a security perspective, you can, I suppose, see the United States as a balancer, an offshore balancer, vis-à-vis other big powers in the region, China being the obvious one. But at the same time, as far as Vietnam is concerned, they continue to have some reservations about the United States. The propensity—you see it less today with the Trump administration for some rather bizarre reasons—but the propensity of previous administrations and the tendency generally to highlight issues of human rights and political freedoms. This is something that the Vietnamese don't take too kindly to. The reputation, fair or otherwise, the reputation that the United States has garnered as a government or as a country that at various times advocates or even tries to effect regime change. I think it's more complicated than that, but nevertheless, there is a narrative out there that the Americans tend to want to do that: to democratize people, to change regimes, and things like that, the latest being Iran, of course. This is something that Vietnam, not just Vietnam, many other countries in the world, no one likes the idea of an external party coming to you and basically preaching to you and telling you what you should and should not do, let alone trying to effect change in your government. Singapore won't accept that, Vietnam won't accept that; no country will accept that. But there is this narrative around United States foreign policy, and that generates reservations on the part of Vietnam as well.

Joseph Liow 26:58
American foreign policy has always been a tricky balance between interest and values. This is less so today for the Trump administration, where it's very clear they're not too interested in values and have a very narrow definition of their interests. While the Trump administration is different, it represents a rather bizarre configuration of governing power today. In a sense, it's the exception that proves the rule.

The norm has always been that when you have more mainstream administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, there's this idea of the United States being the "city on the hill." It's a country very proud of its democracy and its history, which is essentially the path through which they achieved their current democracy. This is why, by the way, what the Trump administration has been doing has elicited such a visceral response: American society, in general, is very proud of the democratic institutions they've built up over their history. The current perception is that this administration is undermining them at will, which explains some of the tension.

Regardless, the United States certainly carries this sense in its foreign policy. I'm not saying it's the dominant stream in foreign policy; depending on the administration, sometimes it's more evident, other times it's more controlled. I would like to think that, at least in recent times, American administrations have bothered to listen more to the world and are more careful to ensure that their message, whether explicit or implicit, is not about regime change or democratization. You see leaders from the Obama, Biden, and even Trump administrations going out of their way to say that.

Keith 31:55
US exceptionalism implies "I'm so good, you must be like me," whereas Chinese exceptionalism is "I'm so good, you can't be like me." These are essentially parallel opposites.

Joseph Liow 32:21
China feels it's so unique that there's nothing about China that can be replicated by the rest of the world. So, two polar opposites of this value argument between the US and China. Regardless, the United States does have that sense to it in foreign policy. I'm not saying it's the dominant stream in foreign policy. Depending on the administration, sometimes it's more evident, other times it's more controlled. I would like to think that, at least in recent times, American administrations have bothered to listen more to the world and are more careful to ensure that their message, whether explicit or implicit, is not about regime change or democratization. You see leaders from the Obama, Biden, and even Trump administrations going out of their way to say that.

Keith 38:49
But if you were to look at the region, especially I think in some of the world that you do, because you focus on political Islam in Southeast Asian society as well. Or there's been a rising wave of anti-Americanism. The thinking is that with the rise of China as an economic and technological powerhouse, there's no real need or urgency to get the Americans on our side. From their perspective, seeing what's happening in Gaza, Iran, or Afghanistan, they might say, "A lot of us are Muslims, and you're here trying to weed out terrorists, targeting us, and you've been very insensitive. Why should we try to engage with you?" What should be the right policymaking response to that?

Joseph Liow 39:56
We need to understand a few things here. First, regarding the US, Islam, and Southeast Asia, we're primarily talking about three countries with Muslim majorities: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Indonesia, of course, is particularly significant as it has the largest concentration of Muslims in one country. Then you have significant minorities in Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. So, it's a very important issue.

Secondly, we must distinguish between popular, grassroots sentiment and the views of the decision-making elite. Decision-makers tend to be more clear-eyed and strategic. It's not just about one issue, because as a leader, you can't possibly be myopically focused on one issue without trying to understand how it connects to many others. This question of US engagement and its role in the region: As much as Muslim political leaders in Indonesia, Malaysia, or anywhere else in Southeast Asia, view open engagement with the United States as problematic due to optics against the backdrop of what's happening in the Middle East today, they also know they cannot be viscerally anti-American to the point of pushing the United States out of the region. They understand they need the United States in the region. So, they have to be subtle in their approach. This is within their job scope as political officeholders.

However, for the general population, it can be different. Sometimes it is about one issue, and that one cherished issue will affect their view on everything else. If we're talking about Muslim identity, religious consciousness, and core affinity with fellow Muslims, they look at what's happening in Gaza. It's not just the United States; it's the US and Israel. The perception is that the US is backing Israel, and Israel is doing these things. So, both are seen as complicit in this. To me, if you look at the situation in Xinjiang or among the Rohingya, you can debate the degree of oppression or repression. But to me, the main difference, like it or not, is Israel. In Gaza, for the Palestinians, Israel is seen as the heart of the problem in the eyes of many Southeast Asian Muslims. I'm not saying Muslims in Southeast Asia therefore advocate for the eradication of Israel, but if you ask them what the main source of instability in Palestinian lands is today, they will tell you it's Israel. That is the distinguishing factor, and of course, the United States' support.

This has affected the public opinion of many Muslims in Southeast Asia regarding the United States. For political leaders, this has to be factored into their calculations concerning both Israel and the United States. With the US, for example, you have to figure out how to ensure Americans remain committed to the region without being seen by these segments of the community or the electorate as overtly pro-US. This is the challenge that political leaders face.

Keith 44:56
I remember speaking to Minister Ong Ye Kung, who discussed his time as the Deputy Chief Negotiator for the US-Singapore FTA. Reading the book on that process, I was surprised by how much effort the Ministry of Trade placed on lobbying Congress back then. You literally had to campaign to each and every representative, just to even explain what Singapore is and where it's located. It's hard work, so kudos to our diplomats.

Of course, as a Singaporean, I might have a biased view, but I will say that Singapore places a lot of attention on that. If only other Southeast Asian countries could place as much attention on that kind of work, Southeast Asia would be in a much better place in terms of our standing in Washington's decision-making, in relation to the interests of American communities outside of Washington.

Joseph Liow 45:33
Yes, I do think so. And also because, like it or not, many people look to Singapore. I repeatedly encounter this every time I go overseas for meetings or conferences. When the discussion is about the US, China, and how the rest of the world deals with them, the Singapore example invariably comes up as one of the most successful cases where a small country has managed to balance that relationship, walking a very narrow and ever-narrowing middle path. We've been able to maintain the trust and support of both the United States and China.

This isn't to say we'll always succeed, or even effectively, because ultimately, it's not just about us; it's about the US and China. If they make it increasingly difficult for countries to walk a middle path, then it will become more difficult. However, I believe we shouldn't fatalistically surrender to the assumption that we will have to pick one side or the other. If you ask me whether both the US and China are actually starting to force us to choose, I would say yes, they are. They might say no, but there are different ways to force someone to choose without explicitly telling them. You create conditions where choice flows naturally. So, if you ask me if there's a push to make us choose, I think yes. But that doesn't mean we should. In fact, I think it would be quite difficult, if not foolish, for us to pick one side or the other.

So, what does that leave us with? We can't be left alone by the two superpowers. It's too late for that because we have made ourselves relevant to the rest of the world. For a long time, our assumption, which is correct, is that because we are small, it's not intuitive that Singapore should survive, let alone thrive. To do that, we must make ourselves relevant. But because we make ourselves relevant, other parties are far more interested in what we choose than in what other countries choose. I don't want to name other countries, but if you have a small island country somewhere in an isolated place, I don't think the Americans and Chinese would care too much about whether they choose China or the US; it's quite immaterial to them. But not in Singapore's case. In Singapore's case, the US looks very closely, China looks very closely, and as I mentioned earlier, the international community looks very closely because they are very interested in how Singapore has managed to do this.

So, the pressure is on us. The question is, what do we do? I think we need to be able to be sure that our bilateral relationships with the United States and with China are not just on solid ground, but that the value proposition we have for each—unique to each—is of such a magnitude that even if they want to make us choose, they will realize it probably shouldn't be a priority for them in their relationship with Singapore.

This is precisely because they want to ensure that whatever value proposition we can offer them is available to them. This means, of course, that we have to work doubly hard to ensure we have a clear sense of what that value proposition is. For a long time, we've managed to do that, for example, with the United States, in terms of the kind of climate we provide them for investment—not just in Singapore, but through Singapore to the rest of the region. We provide the financial services, the legal and jurisdictional infrastructure for them to be confident that they can indeed reap the benefits of their investments in Southeast Asia.

In the same way, with China, since the 90s, we've always made ourselves available to help China in its own development. Everything from providing executive training for their administrators to the investments we have and the government-to-government collaborations we've initiated, which we will continue to do. So, it's very important that we continue to pay a lot of attention to understand the interests of the United States and China, where they want to see their societies and economies going, and from that vantage, what we can do to help them along. That, I think, will be integral in terms of our relationships with the US and with China.

Joseph Liow 53:12
But at the same time, our relationships should not be confined to just the United States and China. We talked a lot about Southeast Asia and ASEAN. I think the time has come, as I mentioned earlier about the 1976 Bali summit and the realization that gave rise to that. I think the time has come for Southeast Asia to realize that the landscape has changed significantly from what we have been familiar with over the last 30 years. The last 30 years were, by and large, wonderful years for ASEAN. There were blips along the way, like financial crises and the war on terrorism, but the general trajectory is that our countries have prospered under this particular global economic and trading system. That has changed, and it's going to continue to change. So, we need to realize that because of these changes upon us, we need to really force ourselves to work together, because our interests and our futures, like it or not, are very much aligned. Yes, you can have a little dispute over a border here, or who owns a temple and the surrounding areas, but in the larger scheme of things, regarding big shifts that will affect local populations, all of us are on the same page. We need to realize that, and after realizing that, we need to realize the urgency of really upping our game collectively to be able to get ahead of these changes.

Keith 54:49
With that, my last question: what's one piece of advice you'd give to your graduating students?

Joseph Liow 55:00
I always tell them it's not going to be a bed of roses out there. So, they need to temper their expectations. I'm a realist and possibly a cynic as well. But at the same time, I would like to urge them to still dare to change and dare to change the world, and dare to challenge convention. Because if we don't do that, if we don't consistently reinvent and innovate, before too long, we're going to find that we are at the tail end of the line. For Singapore, a country like Singapore, with the kind of resources or lack thereof that we have, being at the end of the line is very different from other countries with ample resources being at the end of the line.