Can Singapore Keep Our Economic Miracle Alive? - Inderjit Singh

Can Singapore Keep Our Economic Miracle Alive? - Inderjit Singh

Inderjit Singh is a former Member of Parliament in Singapore who served under the People's Action Party (PAP) from 1996 to 2015, representing the Ang Mo Kio GRC. A seasoned entrepreneur and technologist, he is known for his candid views on innovation, entrepreneurship, and policymaking.

Inderjit played a key role in shaping Singapore’s start-up ecosystem and has remained an influential voice on economic competitiveness, SME growth, and education reform issues. He is also the founder of multiple tech ventures and continues to mentor aspiring entrepreneurs in Singapore and beyond.

TIMESTAMPS:
00:00 Introduction & Trailer to Inderjit Singh
01:13 Inderjit's Journey As An Entrepreneur
07:15 The Difficulty In Gaining Funding in 1990s
14:09 Can Singapore Produce Our Own TSMC
14:28 Singapore's Semiconductor Landscape
17:27 Did Singapore Give Up?
19:04 Revitalising Manufacturing in Singapore
22:01 Becoming the World's Prototyping Hub
25:39 What It Takes To Build A Startup
31:09 Addressing the Financing Gap for Entrepreneurs
33:43 Identifying Opportunities for Singaporean Entrepreneurs
38:44 Fostering Linkages Between Research and Industry
40:08 Balancing Foreign and Local Talent
41:55 Inderjit Singh's Book
42:18 Can Singapore Be More Risk Tolerant?
44:45 How Government Can Support Industry
47:09 Managing A Tech Company & Politics
53:14 How Inderjit Navigated Politics
54:36 What Makes A Good Political Leader
57:17 Singapore's Future Challenges
01:04:06 Advice for Fresh Graduate


Why Start UTAC

Keith 00:01:17

Semiconductors didn't seem to be the fashionable thing to do in the 1990s. Why did you venture into that field?

Inderjit 00:01:24

The norm for young people back then was that after getting your educational qualifications, you'd work for a multinational company or the government. These were stable, well-paying jobs. I followed that same path initially. After graduating from NTU, I needed to earn income for my family, so I joined Texas Instruments and spent 13 years there.

But right from the beginning when I joined Texas Instruments, I didn't do what normal engineers would do. I was solving problems that many engineers couldn't solve, so I was moved from one department to another. The difference between me and others was that I was thinking with an entrepreneurial mindset. I was always looking at the changing environment, thinking out of the box, and searching for opportunities.

Whether it was working at Texas Instruments to get better yields, better quality, or create new products faster, I did those things. But I also became an expert in the industry and saw an opportunity in the semiconductor industry that was changing. The industry was shifting from asset-heavy companies like Texas Instruments—where you do the design, wafer fabrication, packaging, testing, and marketing—towards asset-light companies that just focus on the value of design and IP, then outsource everything else.

I saw this trend coming at that point and thought it would be a great opportunity, so I decided to leave. You're right that many people weren't looking at it that way because we were all in our comfort zones with comfortable, good-paying jobs. It was very hard to look beyond or think out of the box, and I did differently.

Keith 00:03:19

When you chose to leave Texas Instruments, you entered the outsourced assembly and testing space, which is known to be a very low-margin business and highly competitive, compared to maybe the big players upstream today like the design firms such as Nvidia. You entered a very competitive space. What made you think you had a competitive advantage over your industry peers back then?

Inderjit 00:03:48

First of all, that's all I knew because at Texas Instruments, I worked in this area of packaging and testing. But in packaging and testing, we did a few things differently from what normal outsourcing companies would do.

Most outsourcing companies depended on the customer—let's say Nvidia—giving you the package, the package design, and the test program to test and produce their product. But at Texas Instruments, I was in charge of design of packages. I ran a design group and started programming, writing test programs to test. We provided value-added services to our customers and could charge higher for this.

I'll give you an example. I was going for ASUS business in Taiwan, an Acer company doing their semiconductors. They had a wafer fab and needed packaging and testing, and there were players in Taiwan. When I went and offered my price, the president of the company came to me and said, "Why should I give this business to you? Your price is much higher."

I told him, "I'm going to be able to provide this value-add: when your product fails, I'll be able to analyse for you what others may not be able to do." The value-add allowed me to be very competitive.

Keith 00:05:09

A part of me wonders—if you look at the history of semiconductors, Singapore and East Asia benefitted greatly from the outsourcing from Silicon Valley. When you entered, do you think Singapore had some form of competitive advantage? What was the competitive advantage within Singapore that gave you that enablement?

Inderjit 00:05:31

I think it started with the industrialisation policy. You had companies like Texas Instruments, National Semiconductor, and Fairchild that all set up factories in Singapore to take advantage of the great educated workforce we have, good infrastructure, stability, and so on. Many of these big multinationals were looking for places to put their factories. Singapore got some, Malaysia got some, Philippines also got some of these factories.

What this meant is that a lot of the knowledge base was transferred to places like Singapore. We had developed a great deal of expertise and infrastructure in Singapore that knew how to do semiconductors. That was people like me who spent all my time at Texas Instruments for 13 years before I started my own company. The knowledge base was good, the infrastructure was good, and we knew how to run such a business. That was Singapore's advantage.

We had wafer fabs here—Chartered Semiconductors—and Singapore Technologies Assembly and Test. I saw the growth in these areas as very big, and it wasn't difficult for me to find the expertise to come and work with me to start up.

Keith 00:06:55

You raised a record of close to $138 million USD for seed funding, which was pretty much unheard of. It was a record for a long time, and you raised that during the Asian Financial Crisis. This seems to be an extremely hard funding environment. How did you manage to pull that off?

The Difficulty In Gaining Funding in 1990s

Inderjit 00:07:19

In August 1997, together with my brothers, I started another company called Tristar Electronics. We do business in Africa in 38 countries. This was post-financial crisis, and companies were shutting down whilst we were starting up. We couldn't get financing from banks, so I took a big risk and put my house as security to get banking lines. That got us started. Today we do business in 38 countries in Africa. That was managed by a team of people, my brothers included.

But I was planning at the same time to start UT. I started planning this in 1995. When I was ready around '96, I started looking for funding in Singapore. To do a semiconductor assembly factory like what I wanted to do—equipment, factory, clean rooms—you needed a lot of money. My goal was that I needed to raise at least $100 million; if not, it wasn't worth starting.

I looked around in Singapore and couldn't find any money here. Plus, I'd never done a startup before—I was a multinational player. No one believed you could make that switch and become an entrepreneur. I couldn't find money here.

But this is where networking becomes very important. When I was working for Texas Instruments, one of my jobs was quality, and I used to travel all around Asia—Japan, Korea, Taiwan—visiting many companies. I developed a network of friends in Taiwan who got to know me. They knew I was running a very big organisation at Texas Instruments in Singapore.

In 1996, they were going to start a semiconductor company in Taiwan and approached me to become the president of the Taiwanese company. Early 1996, I almost took up the job, but at that point I was also getting ready to get elected as a member of parliament. I thought maybe I'd work there weekends and fly back to do my grassroots work as an MP. But after analysis, I said it just wasn't going to work out.

Since I was already planning my own startup, I told the Taiwanese that I was going to do my own startup in Singapore—maybe they could invest in my startup. That's how the connection started.

As I started planning, I couldn't find money—even semiconductor companies in Singapore, small ones who should have invested and become big, just had no guts to invest. Taiwanese were very gung-ho, very brave investors.

When I was ready with a business plan, they arranged for me to take one day's leave from Texas Instruments and travel to Taiwan. In a room full of maybe 40-50 potential investors, I made one presentation. The only name there was my name—the rest of my management team I didn't name, but I listed their expertise and what they could do. Just based on that one presentation, I had commitment of more than $100 million.

I said, "Sorry, I am a Singapore-based company—at least 30% of the money must come from Singapore." After I got the commitment from Taiwan investors, I came back to Singapore and shared this with some Singapore investors. Then I got Vertex, Singapore Technologies, Temasek-based funds, and a few others who said, "I also want to invest." Initially they didn't want to, but the moment Taiwanese came in... That's how I raised $138 million US to start.

Keith 00:10:54

You raised an interesting point—you couldn't find money at the start in Singapore despite it being a financial hub. Comparatively, Taiwan might not have been as established as a financial hub, but you had plenty of people interested. Other than the fact that they were gung-ho, what do you think they understood about your business back then that you felt the Singaporeans didn't?

Inderjit 00:11:18

That period was a tech boom period. They knew that investing in tech companies would give them good returns. They were just there for the money and to invest in a good team. Because they knew me—who I was—they trusted me and knew I could bring a team. That was a gamble they took.

For them, it was "How much money can I make?" This was a tech company—semiconductors. Not many people start semiconductor companies all the time, so they saw an opportunity and grabbed it. $100 million is a lot, but they knew returns could be quite substantial. This was a great startup.

I call it a fairy tale startup. The moment I got the commitment in February 1998, I tendered my resignation with Texas Instruments. They were quite upset and wanted me to stay on, offering me any job, any salary. I turned it down.

In May 1998, I got the rest of my team members to resign. At that time, companies were shutting down. There was a nice factory called Micropolis that went bankrupt—a government-owned 400,000 square foot building with 60,000 square feet of clean room. I needed a clean room. If I bought or rented a new factory, it would have taken six to seven months just to build a clean room. But this had a ready-made clean room.

I targeted this building. I had cash and it was under liquidation, so I went after that building and won the bid at $38 million, although I think it cost them about $60 million to build the factory.

That was July 1998—I could start almost immediately. August is normally the seventh month in Chinese belief, the ghost month. I was told you cannot start renovation in that month. What I did with my team members—because I know Singapore culture—one day before the ghost month, we went in with hammers and started breaking walls. We started before so I could continue during August to continue the renovation.

In the meantime, I went to look for customers and won two customers: Fujitsu and Siemens. By November 1998, we started production. By first quarter '99, we were already operationally profitable. By 2000, we had 38 blue-chip customers and got NASDAQ listing approval. It was starting at the right time, at the bottom.

Can Singapore Produce Our Own TSMC

Keith 00:14:13

Now I look at the global chip wars playing out. When we look around at other East Asian economies that rose with us, we saw that in Taiwan you have TSMC, in South Korea you have Samsung—these are giants that have emerged. Do you think Singapore could have produced that kind of company? What would it have taken?

Singapore's Semiconductor Landscape

Inderjit 00:14:31

When I was trying to do UT, no one believed this could be done in Singapore. Even people from EDB didn't want to support me. I had a lot of trouble getting support from them. But I just went on and announced that in five years we'll invest half a billion dollars. They were shocked—I had $138 million and could raise more funds. When I made that announcement, everyone was surprised.

This is where sometimes too much government analysis and involvement creates trouble. At that time, we had a semiconductor company called Chartered Semiconductors as a wafer fab. We had another assembly and test I mentioned—STATS. We had a lot of semiconductor expertise.

Many people told me it's too expensive to start a packaging and testing company in Singapore. But I knew how to do it efficiently, better than others, and we were profitable as my results showed. But I think there were others who weren't analysing that we could be competitive in this area anymore.

Guess what the government entities did? They sold Chartered Semiconductors to Global Foundries and sold STATS. Basically, we sold our jewels because we gave up on our ability to do semiconductors.

If we had kept it until today, I think we would have been one of the big players in this area. Today we have semiconductor companies in Singapore, but they're not Singapore-owned—they're owned by others. I think there was a judgment error by some agencies, including that they didn't believe I could make UT a success.

This is where sometimes too much interference by government creates a problem. The idea was that they should just let it be and let these companies expand. We had the expertise, packaging and testing experience, wafer fab expertise. We just needed to move up the value chain and do design and IP, but we gave up.

If you don't have that, how can you continue to move up the value chain? This is something I hope is a lesson learned—that we don't exit. Sometimes economic planning is such that in the 1990s, semiconductors was a sexy business. "Let's invest." Then, "Next 20 years is going to be photonics. Let's forget about semiconductors and jump to photonics."

I believe we should continue the wave and do whatever we can as far as possible. UT today is still in Singapore, still successful, doing very well. I think the others could have continued to do very well. I always thought about whether we could have our own version of a TSMC equivalent. We were almost there, but we gave up.

Did Singapore Give Up?

Keith 00:17:30

It was also partly driven by an MNC-driven culture. You alluded to it earlier—you felt like they didn't believe in you even though you had the expertise. To the Taiwanese, you could convince them to invest money with you. Why do you think at that point they found it hard to believe in you?

Inderjit 00:17:50

Risk averseness was a big problem at that time. We didn't have many entrepreneurs who became very successful. I mean, Sim Wong Hoo was there, and a couple of others, but they just didn't believe it could be done.

As I said, I couldn't get support from government agencies. I just gave up on some of these and did it on my own without waiting for any support from them. I think that was better because then I didn't have to worry about reporting back and so on.

I think it was risk averseness, comfort zone. The old model was that MNCs will drive our economy and we should continue to just do that. This is a very risky approach because there will come a time when our region will catch up with us. They're cheaper than us, they'll have educated people—Vietnam, for example. MNCs will just go to where it's cheaper and easier for them to do business. Once they move, we'll be left with a hollow economy.

Revitalising Manufacturing in Singapore

Keith 00:19:05

Do you think it's possible to revitalise that manufacturing and semiconductors?

Inderjit 00:19:12

I think we should never lose manufacturing dominance contributing to the GDP. We were about 30% a long time ago, went down to 25%, now we're down to less than 20%.

Manufacturing will also catalyse many other industries—supporting industries, design, artistic industry, everything. If you just go for service industry, they're not going to catalyse many other industries. Manufacturing as a core is very important for our economy.

In 2021, when the pandemic hit, I wrote a paper calling to bring back manufacturing to Singapore. I made a recommendation that we should bring back manufacturing contribution to GDP to at least 25% of the economy. I also said we cannot do low-end manufacturing, but for semiconductors, we can continue to do for many more years to come if we had it.

I also made another recommendation. We have lots of IP that we develop in universities, A*STAR, and research institutions, but these are not being used—they're sitting on shelves. Billions of dollars we spend. How can we bring it up?

I made a recommendation that we can become a prototyping factory of the world. Prototyping doesn't mean doing in the lab—prototyping means you are pre-mass production. You do some production, you can sell from there. But once you have the expertise, then whether we do manufacturing in Singapore or neighbouring countries or anywhere, you are the expert and you will have to be involved to help, or they will need you to keep going to the next generation.

Prototyping factory of the world I think is a viable thing. We can be the centre, and then whether we go to the region—like the deal we're making with Malaysia where factories should go there—we can manage from here. Some factories can also be in Singapore.

If we do the prototyping factory of the world concept and do high-end manufacturing here, then use the hinterland for others, this will be something that will keep us going for a long time.

When I sent that paper to the minister in charge at that time, I had a meeting with him. A few months later, he made an announcement that the government plans to increase the GDP contribution of manufacturing by 50% in the next decade. So 50% of that 20% is actually going to add another 5-10%. I'm glad they took that recommendation.

But what has happened is we haven't seen local manufacturing come out, but we've seen a lot of MNCs. During the pandemic and periods of instability, they look for safe havens. We continue to focus on multinational investment. It's good—you get them while you can—but we should never neglect creating your own local future MNCs. That support I think is not enough from the government side.

Becoming the World's Prototyping Hub

Keith 00:22:07

I wanted to start with the point on becoming the world's prototyping factory. What competitive advantages do you see in Singapore now that can enable that?

Inderjit 00:22:17

Our people. All the multinationals hire many of our Singaporean expertise. Let's take semiconductors—we have lots of people who are expert in semiconductors. As multinationals move out, they basically become available or unemployed. But even if they're still employed, the expertise we have is tremendous in every industry—pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, semiconductors, and electronics. That is our biggest strength.

Second strength is IP. The government's five-year plans—$20 billion for five years investment in R&D plan, research innovation enterprise plan—every five years they announce we spend a lot of money developing IP. But as I mentioned earlier, IP doesn't get commercialised. Someone needs to take this and commercialise the IP and create the industries.

I think there's a tremendous opportunity there. The people are there, IP is there. We may not have capability to do mass production for everything, but at least we can start doing the prototyping and be the centre of control. Whether the factories are in any part of the world, you be the centre of control and will therefore always be a very important part of the global economy because it starts here. Pre-manufacturing starts here.

Keith 00:23:52

What are the conditions that the government or Singapore must create for us to make that transition?

Inderjit 00:23:57

I think two areas. One is the willingness to invest in these areas. I couldn't find money for UT. I believe we still see some of this problem—it's a lot better than my time in '98. Some of our funds need to start looking at these areas, especially government-owned funds. Should you look at IP that can create a prototyping factory that could go into mass production one day? Just focus in this area with government funds.

The other problem for us is really the cost—it's very high in Singapore. To do a prototyping factory, you need factory space. We need to go back to the old days of JTC where they provide affordable rental. Otherwise you go to the market—it's very expensive, you don't raise so much money, you end up burning your money and premature collapse.

These two things: affordable testing ground for prototyping factories—not small offices but enough to do prototyping—and also enough funding in this area. That's it.

It's fundamentally an issue of trying to find the best place to house your talent or get the highest return on your talent, because the talent will either be employed by MNCs or Singaporean companies. Ideally you want a balanced mix.

What It Takes To Build A Startup

Keith 00:25:33

The other question I had was on talent in Singapore. When you started UT, you had to find talent and very specific expertise in your team. What were the things you were looking out for when trying to build your team?

Inderjit 00:25:47

In a startup, if you look at why startups fail, other than money, the biggest reason is the team. You have a big team, the team breaks up, the team cannot work together. In times of pressure, there's a lot of conflict. Focus on team is very important. You must get the right people.

For me, I had worked with this group of people for a long time. I was director of the whole operation at Texas Instruments when I decided to start. Getting a team that can not just have the expertise but also ability to work together—you put 10 Ronaldos into one team is not as good as a team that is cohesive.

My first criteria: I needed $100 million. Second: I needed a team that can work with me. That was enough. Then finding opportunities—we had to work hard to find opportunities with customers. But these two things were the very important starting point.

Keith 00:26:47

But you said earlier that it was hard to get people, or at the very least, back then not many people were looking for something more adventurous. How do you convince them?

Inderjit 00:27:01

It was a tech boom at that time. I asked each one of my team members, "Tell me, in five years' time, how much money would you like to make?" I told them, "I can—you have the potential of making more than what you want."

Everyone got shares in the company—free shares. Some bought, some got free shares. Most got free shares which I helped them acquire. We all became owners of the company. We had shares—although small percentage—but we became shareholders. We were all motivated to make it successful. We all worked hard.

Having skin in the game is very important. You have to share the gains with everyone.

Keith 00:27:52

But back then the culture was much more risk-averse as opposed to now. If you could make an educated analysis of the culture of risk aversion in Singapore—something that Lee Kuan Yew also highlighted before, saying people are not gamblers here—what explains our general risk aversion?

Inderjit 00:28:10

Comfort zones. When I was working in Texas Instruments, many of the people at the corporate level, high-level corporate level, were from Taiwan, from India, from Malaysia, but no Singaporeans at the top in the corporate because Singaporeans did not want to work outside Singapore. But many of these people were willing to relocate to other locations.

That was our biggest problem—we are such a safe country, so successful, we get paid well, and we all enjoy the comfort zone and refuse to get out of the comfort zone. This was the problem we had in the past.

We did try to change it, by the way. By the end of the 20th century, beginning of 21st century, government realised that our economy was very cyclical and the old models had to change. There was a government initiative called the Economic Review Committee headed by our former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. I think deputy was our president Tharman when he was a minister. They wanted to see how to restructure the economy—financial centre, MBS, casinos, and one of the recommendations we made was to create a more entrepreneurial economy.

To do that, we also recommended that government appoint a minister in charge for entrepreneurship. That was Raymond Lim. He formed an organisation called the Action Community for Entrepreneurship, and I was deputy chairman for quite a few years. All were private sector—only the minister was from government. The idea was how the minister could bring initiatives from the private sector into cabinet.

That was a turning point for this risk averseness. We decided we would look at many areas. Financing—I wanted to tackle financing. Why is it so difficult to get money in Singapore? Because I faced that problem. So I spent most of my time in government trying to solve it.

I chaired the committee on how to improve financing. We looked internationally in Asia, we looked at culture, we looked at education. We had five committees that we set up. We brought entrepreneurs, shared their stories—success stories, failure stories—so we could inspire the next generation. Went to schools, went to universities.

We wanted cultural change, educational change, exposure to international markets, make it easier to raise funds in Singapore so the risk averseness would go away. This was in 2003 we started after the review. I would say we spent 10-12 years and made great progress.

Today, I want to say that our young are more willing to take the plunge when they have an idea to start, but it wasn't at that point. We needed a cultural change and we drove it through Action Community for Entrepreneurship.

Addressing the Financing Gap for Entrepreneurs

Keith 00:31:13

You highlighted that you were very focused on solving the financing gap. What were the problems you saw back then that a lot of entrepreneurs faced like yourself, and what are some of the policies that you pushed for and advocated for?

Inderjit 00:31:24

Even before ACE was formed and I was already in parliament, I decided to form a committee called financing for SME committee. I brought in industry experts, entrepreneurs, VCs, bankers—a 20-member committee, I can't remember the exact number. I got SPRING Singapore to be my secretary.

I decided to go to all the countries where it's really easy to get rather vibrant financing. I went to Silicon Valley, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Canada—I went everywhere. I looked at what type of financing was available—government-supported or private sector-supported, angel investors, VCs, and so on.

I came back and wrote a report for the government on what we need to do to make Singapore a more vibrant financing environment for startups and SMEs. Fortunately, this was my own initiative. The government found out about it, got me to present to them. They were so excited and wanted to implement.

I asked the government, "Can you please form a committee for implementation?" Tharman, who was in charge, laughed and said, "You want this to be implemented? You become the chairman for implementation."

So I formed an implementation committee and we started implementing many of these things—angel networks, VCs, and so on. A lot of effort from the government. Government had put in a $1 billion fund to bring VCs into Singapore. So $1 billion—they brought many VCs from all over the world to invest in Singapore-based companies, angel investors, loan financing schemes. Many of these schemes were put together.

I think today our environment is a lot more vibrant. I would dare say that if you cannot find the money, the problem is not with the financing—maybe you don't have a great idea, you don't have a great team. Solve that problem and you'll find the right money. It's changed quite a lot.

I spent 20 years in parliament on policies and all this just to focus—I wanted to do this because we needed that to change.

Identifying Opportunities for Singaporean Entrepreneurs

Keith 00:33:47

Are there certain sectors that you think our entrepreneurs should be focused on?

Inderjit 00:33:53

We've got a lot of IP. We really need to bring in people who know how to commercialise this IP and form good teams. I think that's a very important part which is something our entrepreneurs maybe need to do a better job of to attract the financing.

I know the VCs who are based in Singapore—most of the investment is outside Singapore. They enjoy the tax benefits of being a VC in Singapore, but they can't find enough good deals here. They're investing in the region—India, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and so on—because they can't find enough good deals.

Good deals mean a great opportunity and a great team. Great opportunity means it's not your backyard—can you go global right from day one? No matter what technology you're talking about—AI, semiconductors, photonics, whatever—first of all, you must be able to think global right from day one. If you think you can go global right from day one and you can assemble a good team, I think you can find the right money.

Keith 00:35:04

The gap between IP and commercialisation—that's been a problem we've identified. If I were to ask you why that's the case, because it seems to me that if you look at other regions, they are equally competitive as well. That gap seems to be smaller. In Singapore, it seems we're producing a lot of IP but really we have no entrepreneurs. Is it the fact that we're just a small population and we should be okay with importing more talent, or is there something we're missing in the formula?

Inderjit 00:35:22

I think it's both. We have to be realistic. If you compare to the one million engineers that graduate in India and China every year and how many we graduate in Singapore—we are small.

But also I think we need to develop that entrepreneurial spirit in our people. When you see an opportunity, take the plunge. It's a mindset thing. It's not just about making money—it's a mindset. Are you willing to do it? I see more younger people willing to do it now.

But the next thing is that the IP—most of it sits in universities or government institutions. IP must not be so expensive for someone to license or take up. I think the bigger problem is not just that—although maybe sometimes the cost of licensing is a deterrent and people don't do it—but also, I don't think professors and researchers automatically make good entrepreneurs.

How can we partner these researchers and professors with experienced people who are also hungry enough to go and start a company based on expertise that both of them have? Who's got industry experience, who have done it before? That linkage I think we should focus on—how can we link the two together?

The IP is there. About seven years ago, two professors from NTU in the area of cyber security had a great idea. They made a presentation in Israel. Suddenly the Israelis got very interested and wanted to spin off the company. I stopped them, got them to present to me, and got another person from Singapore. We put in a million dollars and spun off and created a cyber security company.

On their own, they did not see the value, but me from industry saw the value. We created the company. I chaired the board of the company and the professors were running it for a few years.

If you don't create that link to the industry, you may not see the potential.

Keith 00:37:31

How do you then create that link?

Inderjit 00:37:31

I would say luck, because I was on the board of NTU and the professors knew me. In fact, in NTU, as a board member, I focus on behalf of the board on innovation and entrepreneurship and startups and spin-offs. That was one of the roles I was given. So they knew who to come to, and so by chance.

But yes, I think we need to focus on how to create that linkage. Showcase your technology and have more of these sessions to bring people in and try to create the linkages.

Now we must not assume that it is only certain technologies that will be used. We must leave it to the industry to see what it is that they want. It does not work that way because you never know—AI 10 years ago was not known in Singapore. Then suddenly a few years later it became a big thing. Same thing can happen with any technology.

Keith 00:38:21

Basically you're saying that we should try to break down the silos between research and entrepreneurs, and there's a huge amount of luck inside. What I'm trying to figure out is if we think about strengthening that linkage between the private sector and research—are there any policies that you recommend or are there any things that the government can do to foster that, or is it really just don't intervene and let the market decide?

Fostering Linkages Between Research and Industry

Inderjit 00:38:48

I think two things. First of all, actually all the universities and research institutes have organisations that are responsible for commercialisation—just that they haven't had great success. I would say some limited success, but not as great as what the potential is.

These organisations I think really we need to seriously look at how we can strengthen them.

Number two is I advocated this before—IP belongs to the university and anyone who wants it has to pay to license. I advocated to the government just give it for free. Give it up for free—it's sitting on the shelf. Give it for very cheap, $1 or some amount at least for them to try out, but don't make the IP too expensive.

The day our universities become like Stanford where you can create big companies, then you can charge higher fees. Now we are not creating that kind of company, so just give it almost for free. Let companies try it out or entrepreneurs try it out.

Keith 00:39:51

It's almost like you're creating a freemium version perhaps—you're trying to get some market share.

Inderjit 00:39:56

Exactly. You give it all for free and then hopefully it will give you return business.

Balancing Foreign and Local Talent

Keith 00:40:08

If we could zoom out a bit and look at the macro environment that is needed for Singapore to succeed—a huge part of the tension that we face, and I think you've highlighted before in your parliamentary speeches, is that Singapore is a small country that we need to be open, but at the same time we need to be able to manage that flow, that openness of sorts. If you have too many foreign talents, for example, then your local population might obviously feel crowded out. How do you think we should balance that openness in your view?

Inderjit 00:40:37

I think this is a tough one. We don't have enough talent. We have some, but there's lots of talent elsewhere. The government has been trying by regulating what is a minimum salary that you have to pay to a talent from outside. I think they're trying their best. It's a very hard balance to find.

But I think one of the things they tried to do was to make it very easy for entrepreneurs or would-be entrepreneurs to come in to be based in Singapore to try out. I think that's a good policy.

On the other side, I think there needs to be a bit more granular analysis of what are the skills Singaporeans have, the jobs out there, and those that we should be maybe restricting too many foreigners for—jobs that Singaporeans can do. This requires almost regular review and then find a balance.

To be fair, I think they're trying—the government is trying. If we say completely cut off, then our industry economy may not grow. So I think it's a tough balance. I don't envy the government.

Inderjit Singh's Book

Keith 00:41:56

Inderjit wrote this book "The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship" and it's going on sale now. If you use the code ENT20 on wcientific.com, you can get the book for 20% off. Once again, the code is ENT20. This episode is not sponsored by them, but I thought this book was really great in helping me understand the art and science of entrepreneurship. It has helped me become a better thinker and operator in my own small media business. I hope you enjoy the book as much as I did.

Can Singapore Be More Risk Tolerant?

The point that you made also was that we need to create a more risk-tolerant culture. If you look at Singapore, for example, a lot of the policies—let's say you need to get an HDB and things like that, or certain regulations like bankruptcy laws—make it very hard for people to be more risk-taking. If I'm a young Singaporean who wants to be an entrepreneur but I have a BTO that I need to pay off, it makes it very hard for me to be mobile and for me to take risk.

Inderjit 00:42:54

We have gone too far in terms of the cost of living—it's too expensive. The risk of losing your house is so high. Bankruptcy—whether it's fraud or you fail because of business, you're treated as the same type of bankrupt.

I did actually in parliament make some speeches about how to have a Chapter 11 type of system like companies have in the US—that you protect and rather than make the person bankrupt straight away, you have protection and then see how to give them some runway to be able to come out of it.

If you can do things like that to protect... but our big problem here is that our cost of everything is so high that people will become more and more risk-averse. If I go bankrupt, I lose my house. Where am I going to find the next house? If I don't have a job, where am I going to... how am I going to support my family?

These are things we need to think about. I hope that over time, policy-wise, allowing property prices to shoot up so high was a mistake on the government's part. But it's too late—you cannot reverse it because all house owners will suffer. But I think from now until the future, we should never allow property prices to go at the rate that they went. Let wages catch up so that it's no more a big risk.

In the West, if you've lost your house in Silicon Valley, you just go to the suburbs and you can find another cheaper house. But we don't have that option. Of course, Singaporeans are starting to go to Johor and live there—that may be an option. But the BTOs are also very expensive right now.

Keith 00:44:38

You also talked about the role of someone like JTC, for example, to ensure that industrial properties, especially those that are going to be land-intensive, continue to enjoy a subsidised rate.

How Government Can Support Industry

Inderjit 00:44:51

Actually, this is the most important role government can play in helping the prototyping factory or all this—to bring back the share of JTC ownership of property to higher percentage like what it was in the past.

If you look, just drive around Jurong, you'll see many industrial factories empty, owned by someone, but they don't do manufacturing in Singapore. I've seen quite a few. I recommended this in my paper that I wrote during COVID on manufacturing base—government buys back this property even if it's at market rate. Buy back and convert all of this into your JTCs of the future.

There are a lot of this very poorly used... near my place in Chai Chee, so many buildings that are empty and storage space and so on—wasted space. I think government can acquire many of these and then bring back the JTCs and allow our prototyping factories to come up in these places.

Keith 00:45:55

Are there any other gaps that you see that you think the government should be more actively addressing? We've got the financing done, we want to make it affordable for people...

Inderjit 00:46:09

I think make it easier to bring in the right type of talent, which I think the government is trying. So we've got all of this—we really now need to bring the IP out to industry. There needs to be very active participation or facilitation by someone to allow this thing to happen. Not just hope that it happens, but actually to appoint someone who actually can make this prototyping or startup or IP commercialisation happen more.

We put a lot of money, but we are not getting the result. Something is wrong. There needs to be a big review on how we can get all of this... Now we know if you look at all the reports—with AI, 50% of the jobs will be gone in a few years and so on. It's a lot more urgent right now to actually do what I'm just saying—bring it out, commercialisation, and so on—because people will be there. They're educated, they got expertise, but they may not have a job.

How can we do this? In the next 10 years, we have to get it right so that we can create the future industries that can keep us going.

Managing A Tech Company & Politics

Keith 00:47:17

I'd like to focus a little bit now also on your journey in both entrepreneurship and politics, because I think you're also one of the pioneers in managing both. It's very hard to run a tech company and be an MP at the same time, which you did successfully for many years. Why did you want to volunteer for two full-time jobs in that case?

Inderjit 00:47:35

I did not want to go into politics actually. When I was in university, I was a student leader. My student leadership was really to help my fellow students. I started the students' union as the first chairman of the council in NTU. I started a triple electrical engineering club in NTU. I started many of these organisations. I had a pioneering spirit in me to serve people.

When I graduated, I became an RC member in my area and was very active. I helped the MP fight the election. There came a time when he said—and I was moving up in my career, doing quite well in Texas Instruments—he asked me whether I want to... and "I want to send you for the PAP party where they select candidates. Are you okay?"

I thought about it and said, "Well, as a grassroots leader, I'm doing certain things for my community. As an MP, I can do more for Singaporeans." For me, I saw it as national service—that if I can do more, why don't I mind doing more? It was never a career, but it was community service, service to Singapore.

My focus was always on my career. But I believe that when you have a responsibility, do it well. Don't just be an MP in name and you don't do your job. Which means I had to sacrifice something, and the sacrifice really was family time. Fortunately, I had a very supporting wife and family who helped me a lot.

I did not neglect my children completely—I know I did spend time with them—but they could have got a bit more attention. But then I could do both. I did not neglect my MP duties. I was quite popular on the ground there, and I created new tech and other companies after that. I was tough—I could do it when I was young. I don't think I can do it now at this age.

Keith 00:49:26

I guess it gives you two added lenses—one as an MP, you are able to understand policy, but someone who's from the private sector who's very familiar with the industries, you could also add value and add depth to the conversations.

Inderjit 00:49:38

Yes, I think I was one of the very few who had that background. I'd done it before, I knew the problems in an MNC, in startup, and so as I say, 20 years I wanted to go and change that, in addition to what I could do for my residents and Singaporeans.

I did quite a lot in this area. I actually spent a lot of time coming up with ideas on industry, on financing, many things. So much so that one day I got a call from Richard Hu, who was finance minister at that time. He called me and said, "Inderjit, can I ask you to come by and brief my civil servants on all the ideas you have? You have many ideas—they don't have great ideas. Why don't you share ideas with them and we see what we can do?"

I was very happy because I wanted my ideas to get through so that the civil servants understand what I can explain to them. Making speeches alone—they won't understand everything. So I spent quite a few hours doing this.

Similarly, Mr Han Fook Kwang, when he was permanent secretary in MTI, I believe he wanted to come up with some scheme to incentivise angel investment into startups. He actually came all the way to see me in my office to get some ideas from me in formulating the policy.

I spent my time trying to change things so that things will become better for future entrepreneurs.

Keith 00:51:01

If there were some of the policies that you think—I would say you're proud of, or some of the policies that you think really moved the needle—would there be any that come to your mind?

Inderjit 00:51:12

In general, the financing environment—I think that was a very big change over a period of time. A lot of... although we did not achieve everything we wanted, but I think that was one area that I'm quite happy about.

The other part of it is the funding that goes to the universities in promoting innovation. I think this is another thing that... I'm not the only one, I'm sure others also came, but I think that became a very big... I was on the board of NTU for 20 years, so I also played a role there to try to transform how we can change things in the university.

The other part I was involved in was this organisation called the Pro-Enterprise Panel headed by the chief of civil service, Mr Lim Siong Guan, at that time. The idea here is if there are rules and regulations that are stifling business environment, can we change these rules and regulations?

I actually took it on as a personal challenge to visit all the industry associations, all the organisations, dialogue sessions to find out from them what are the problems you're facing. Came back, distilled, and then made recommendations to the government that we change these rules and regulations.

The Pro-Enterprise Panel as a whole—during my time there were 2,000 rules that we either eliminated or changed so that it becomes easier for the business environment. This is another area that I'm very proud of.

The other one, of course, is Action Community for Entrepreneurship. I was deputy chairman there for a few years. The chairman's role as a minister is to bring our ideas into cabinet, but the deputy chairman drove most of the activities. I oversaw...

One of the things I brought to Singapore was I became the co-president of World Entrepreneurship Forum. It's a global representation and also became a global exposure for Singapore. I wanted Singapore to be on the map. I'm still currently president of the startup committee of the World Business Angel Forum and on the board. My goal is to get Singapore on the world map so that we are never forgotten.

How Inderjit Navigated Politics

Keith 00:53:21

You've been very active in pushing policies to encourage entrepreneurship and pro-business environment in Singapore, but there's a huge political element to it in which you as an MP used to represent the interests of the people. My question is, during your close to 20 years of political experience, how do you navigate that perhaps sometimes opaque and complicated political environment?

Inderjit 00:53:47

I think the advantage I had was I'd done it before. I'd seen the problems, and whatever I brought into parliament were not stories—they were real issues. I was constructive. When I came out with any criticism, I also had ideas. It was very constructive criticism, and that was important. It was not just an attack just to become popular, but to really solve problems. That has always been my approach—that we have to solve problems.

Of course, there were times when ministers were not happy with me, but that did not stop me. I fought very hard to eliminate early streaming in primary school and many of these things. I had crossroads with ministers many times, but I just... I was not there for political career. I was there to serve Singaporeans. I didn't mind getting the brunt of the scolding or the unhappiness—that was fine with me.

What Makes A Good Political Leader

Keith 00:54:47

For someone that's been there for 19 years and championing a lot of policy improvements and reform, what makes a good minister in terms of their ability to guide the country and solve complex problems?

Inderjit 00:54:58

I made a speech in 2011 after we lost a GRC that we needed to inject a lot of political judgement in policymaking. I think many of our policies initiate from the civil service—ministers initiate it, civil servants formulate it—but then there is not enough injection of political judgement. That means understanding of how is it going to impact the people really, or how in implementation you have to implement so that you achieve the desired result.

I think a minister who can do this is a good minister—that you don't just come up with policies that are recommended by a group of scholars or civil servants, but also those that are realistic enough that will achieve the desired result and have taken care of the issues.

I had some ministers who used to tell me, "We'll do this, but we'll worry about the problems if it comes." Now that is very irresponsible. This is like economic growth at all costs. I had a minister say, "Oh, we'll worry about problems when they come—we'll solve them." I thought you should pre-empt what is going to happen and modify your policy so that you can at least minimise the negative impact on the ground.

Political judgement in policymaking I think is very important for a good minister.

Keith 00:56:18

Were there any examples that you saw in real life that you thought, "Well, this minister did a good job of exercising good political judgement"?

Inderjit 00:56:25

Khaw Boon Wan did a great job when he was appointed as National Development Minister. Before that, many MPs used to complain about the housing problem, but we were always given what the civil servants are good at—statistics that show "No, it's no problem." But as MPs on the ground, we knew the problem was really bad. People were upset, they were not getting their houses, people losing their houses—things like that were happening. But the connection was not happening to the minister because the minister was given statistics and he believed that.

But Khaw Boon Wan came in... after 2011, he became National Development Minister. He understood the realities on the ground and saw, built rental houses, got the right housing policies in place, and so on. I think there's an example of a good minister who injected good political judgement.

The other one early on was Raymond Lim, who was in charge of entrepreneurship. I think he believed in it and he brought it to cabinet and it made real impact in a lot of these areas.

Singapore's Future Challenges

Keith 00:57:25

If I could now ask you to maybe participate in some form of future forecasts—if you were to look at the coming years and decades ahead, it's clear that we're entering into a much more multipolar, much more ambiguous world. What are some of the challenges that you think Singapore will face in the coming years that not just the policymakers must pay attention to, but we as citizens ought to pay attention to?

Inderjit 00:57:52

I see the next 10 years as a period of great disruption, almost like a resetting of the world and definitely a resetting for Singapore.

The first challenge is going to be the challenge posed by AI that is going to restructure jobs. Nowadays, I get many of my answers by using AI platforms. I'll give you an example—lawyers. Junior lawyers' job mainly is to go and analyse past cases and come up with precedents and examples and so on. Guess what? AI can take it all over, and these junior lawyers will lose their jobs. It's a good example.

Accountants—audit nowadays, everything is online. AI can do a better audit than auditors can do, so they will lose their jobs. I think this is the biggest challenge—how useful are we going to be? This is going to be our individual responsibility on how we can prepare ourselves for this world and then be able to have a meaningful career, meaningful way to earn income for the family, meaningful way to live our life. We have to adjust to this.

How to do that? I think I don't have the answers, but I think we have to start thinking about this because it's going to come very fast. We're already seeing all the tech companies laying off whole bunches of people. AI can do programming for you, so you may not need so many programmers anymore.

On the government side, it's going to be the ability to create the kind of industries and jobs that can create opportunities for people to participate with the skills that we have. I think the biggest issue they have to tackle right now is going to be the cost challenge.

I had recommended sometimes in the past that government should form a cost competitiveness committee—that's the most important committee that you must form. Not just a tariff committee that's there—it's important—but I think the cost competitiveness committee has to look at resetting the cost competitiveness in Singapore, look at every angle.

In 1985, Lee Hsien Loong headed a committee that looked at cost competitiveness. I think it's about time we do it, but the government is kind of blindsided, not doing anything about cost. If we don't solve this cost problem, we'll have people who need good salary but cannot get good-paying jobs. How do we solve this problem?

Now then the tariffs are coming. I look at it as the world has to be realigned. The old world wars, conflicts, and all those issues—I think one power is not sustainable. I think this will be a rebalancing of the world, and I think the tariff war that's happening right now is going to create big problems for everyone around the world.

But I also think it's a good thing that's happening because we all have to learn how to live in a new world where we don't depend on one or two countries for our trade and business. This is a resetting period. We'll have short-term pain, but I think if we do the right thing, we'll be able to achieve long-term gain on how to restructure ourselves to be able to manage this.

So jobs, cost, and the resetting of the world geopolitics and tariffs—these are the three big challenges. But with my entrepreneurial mindset, I say these challenges are also opportunities.

When I started UT in 1998, just during the financial crisis, the whole semiconductor industry was losing a lot of money, bleeding. But I saw an opportunity of the future in a challenging environment. I started at the right time—I could get people, I could buy equipment, I could get... so I saw opportunities amid challenges.

Similarly, with this big resetting that's going around the world, I would advise every one of us to look at what are the opportunities we can find to improve ourselves, be prepared for the new world, for governments to see what role can we play in the new world. I think for government to also make sure that we have an environment where people will not suddenly feel, "How can I afford to stay here?"

These are all opportunities right now. If the government is starting their five-year term, they do a good job, and Singaporeans at the end of five years feel "my life has got better and I see a great future," they would get better votes in the next election.

Keith 01:02:24

You highlighted this part about the cost competitiveness. It makes me think about whether it's time to also revisit fundamental assumptions that I think you've pointed out—that maybe we shouldn't take it for granted that Singapore is just a high-cost society and you should be okay with it.

Inderjit 01:02:42

I think I mentioned recently in a podcast that the root cause of our problem is cost of real estate. It's so high that it causes problems for companies. Houses are so expensive that I need a high salary.

Unless we get that real estate thing adjusted—it cannot happen overnight because many people would be in trouble—I think there must be a 10-year plan that in 10 years' time, the wages will catch up with the property prices so that it's affordable. Now I will say it's very unaffordable. We solve that problem, I think long-term we are okay. We will not be able to go overnight.

Fifteen years ago, I made a recommendation to the government—don't allow property... I made exactly the same recommendation. They lost track of it and then allowed property prices to go up driven by foreign investments, foreign ownership, and so on. I think this is something that now you better manage properly.

You solve that problem, you solve a lot of problems. But the government on their part are doing the right thing of trying to create good jobs, high-paying jobs, high-salary jobs that can make you feel that all these things are affordable. That is an important goal and they have to continue to do that.

But I would say that we must also show our young a sense of hope and opportunity—that if I work hard and if I do the right thing, if I think like an entrepreneur, I also can do well in this place. This is the thing that I think is worth time for the government to spend on. How can we create a sense of hope and opportunity for our young for the future of Singapore?

Advice for Fresh Graduate

Keith 01:04:14

If you have one piece of advice that you would like to give to a fresh graduate entering the working world today, what would it be?

Inderjit 01:04:21

I would say think like an entrepreneur. Develop an entrepreneurial mindset. The first thing I wrote in my book—I have many things I wrote—the first mantra I wrote was: there's no problem in the world that cannot be solved. If you can think like that—I face a problem and I'm going to be able to solve it—then I think you can overcome any challenges that come along. This is basically entrepreneurial mindset.

I wrote my book called "The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship" really to impact the spirit of thinking. It's not about starting companies. "Art and Science of Entrepreneurship"—the art portion is about how can you develop a mindset that makes you think like an entrepreneur.

When I was working in Texas Instruments, I did many things there that many engineers would not have done. I did it because I was thinking out of the box. People who could not solve problems gave up, and I could solve it because my mindset was different.

My advice is develop an entrepreneurial mindset for yourself in whatever career you do. You don't have to start a company, but you actually behave like an entrepreneur in whatever you do in the future.

Keith 01:05:22

Those are very wise words of advice. Thank you, Inderjit, for coming on.

Inderjit 01:05:25

Thank you. It was a pleasure. Thank you.

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